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NOTE RE: PARTIES 
The undersigned counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants represents that the parties 
named in the caption have been the only parties to this litigation. Plaintiffs-
Appellants, Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel, have settled their claims 
against former defendants Omni Products, Inc., Union Pacific Railroad Company, and 
Utah Transit Authority. Those entities are no longer parties to this litigation. The only 
remaining defendants and the only true appellees are Salt Lake City Southern Railroad 
Company, Inc. and Salt Lake City Corporation. 
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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is on appeal from a directed verdict and other rulings in favor of 
defendant-appellee Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. ("Southern"), and 
from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-appellee Salt Lake City 
Corporation ("the City"), and from a judgment and final order, with all rulings having 
been made by, and with all orders and the judgment having been entered by, the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley). The 
District Court entered its order formally dismissing the Goebels' claims against the 
City on July 8, 2002. It entered Judgment in favor of Southern (the last defendant 
against which the claims of Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel, the plaintiffs-
appellants, were resolved at the District Court level) on August 29, 2002. It denied the 
Goebels' Motion for New Trial on September 24, 2002. The Goebels filed their 
Notice of Appeal, in the District Court, in timely fashion, on September 27, 2002. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1. Whether, in this most substantial personal injury and loss-of-
consortium case, the District Court (having denied Southern's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the evidence pertinent to the issue having come in at trial as it had been 
developed at the summary judgment stage) committed reversible error when, in the 
face of direct evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and in the 
1 
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face of settled Utah law, it granted Southern's motion for directed verdict on the basis 
that Southern had no actual or constructive notice or reasonable opportunity to cure a 
dangerous condition at the subject railroad crossing. 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a 
correction-of-error standard (as purely a question of law). The legal standard for 
granting a directed verdict is essentially the same as that for the granting of summary 
judgment. The evidence must be examined in the light most favorable to the Goebels. 
If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom 
that would support a judgment in favor of the Goebels, the directed verdict must be 
reversed. Management Committee of Gravstone Pine Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Gravstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). The directed verdict will be 
sustained on appeal only if the evidence was such that reasonable people could not 
arrive at a different conclusion. Anderson v. Gribble, 513 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1973).
 { 
No deference is given to the trial court's decision. 
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' having resisted, at oral argument (R. 
6760, Tr. 9-24; 28-33), Southern's motion for directed verdict; by the District Court's 
bench ruling (R. 6761, Tr. 1246-51) granting that motion; and by the District Court's 
Order Regarding Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.'s Duty to Plaintiffs < 
and Granting Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc.'s Motion for Directed 
Verdict ("Directed Verdict Order"). R. 6668-72. 
2 
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Issue No. 2. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in ruling 
that the Goebels could not pursue non-public nuisance claims under Utah Code Ann. 
§56-1-11 on the basis that such claims would be superfluous to the Goebels' 
negligence claims, although that statute does not require a plaintiff to prove a 
defendant's actual or constructive notice of an unsafe condition at a railroad crossing. 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a 
correction-of-error standard. The proper interpretation of a statute is purely a question 
of law. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Equitable 
Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993). No deference is 
given to the trial court's decision. 
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' filing their Motion for Leave to File 
Second Amended Complaint (R. 124-48); by their memorandum in support of that 
motion (R. 149-51); by their reply memorandum in support of that motion (R. 191-
201); by oral argument (not transcribed) (R. 237); and by the District Court's Order on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (R. 363-69), which 
expressly stated (R. 364) that the Goebels could not pursue negligence-related claims 
under §56-1-11, on the basis that such claims would be "superfluous and would add 
nothing to plaintiffs'claims." 
3 
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Issue No. 3. Whether the District Court erred2 in determining, in the face of 
contractual language and in the face of principles recognized in the Restatement, 
Second of Torts, §324A, that Southern owed the Goebels no duty of care under its 
contract with the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"). 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a 
correction-of-error standard (as purely a question of law). A trial court's interpretation 
of a contract is accorded no deference and is reviewed for correctness. Aguagen Int'L 
Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411, 413 (Utah 1998). No deference is given a trial 
court's interpretation and application of the common law. E.g., Trujillo v. Jenkins, 
840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). 
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' submission of their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 3016-3101, at 3071-72; 
3079-80; by the District Court's bench ruling (R. 6760, Tr. 1246), made in the 
procedural context of Southern's motion for directed verdict; and by the Directed 
Verdict Order. R. 6669. 
Issue No. 4. Whether the District Court committed error in determining that 
2
 Given the fact that the District Court determined that Southern owed the Goebels 
duties of care under other legal concepts, the ruling referenced in this issue was not a 
basis for the District Court's granting Southern's motion for directed verdict, but, in 
the new trial to be held, it is an issue that will come up again and should be addressed 
by the Court at this time. For the same reason, the Court should, in this Appeal, 
address Issues Nos. 4 and 5. 
4 
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the subject contract between Southern and UTA was ambiguous and in excluding 
extrinsic evidence regarding that contract. 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue is a 
correction-of-error standard (as purely a question of law). Whether contract language 
is ambiguous is a question of law. Dixon v. Pro-Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 
1999). If a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to explain the intent 
of the parties. Id. No deference is given to the trial court's decision. 
This issue was preserved by oral argument (R. 6764, Tr. 545-56); by attempted 
questioning of UTA executive Crosby Mecham (R. 6764, Tr. 576-79); by further oral 
argument (R. 6765, Tr. 587-94); by proffering proposed trial exhibits P-53, P-54, P-46, 
and P-47 (R. 6765, Tr. 592; 603-04); by the District Court's bench ruling that he 
contract in question was clear and unambiguous (R. 6765, Tr. 598); and by proffering 
Mr. Mecham's testimony (R. 6765, Tr. 598-99). 
Issue No. 5. Whether the District Court committed error in excluding evidence 
of the Goebels' liability expert's empirical testing done in connection with his accident 
reconstruction work. 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to this issue appears to 
be one of abuse of discretion. E.g., Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 17 P.3d 1110, 1114 (Utah 
2000). 
5 
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This issue was preserved in the District Court proceedings by attempted 
questioning of that witness, oral argument, proffer of that witness's testimony, and the 
District Court's ruling (R. 6766, Tr. 840-49); and by proffer of exhibits (enlargements 
of photographs) pertaining to that testimony. R. 6767, Tr. 1212-13. 
Issue No. 6. Whether the District Court committed reversible error in granting 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment, which ruling was predicated on the 
proposition that the 1998 amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act, regarding 
recipients of notices of claims, should be applied retroactively. 
The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to the question of 
whether a statutory charge should be deemed to apply retroactively is a correction-of-
error standard (as purely a question of law). Evans & Sutherland Computer Corp. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1997); Brown & Root Indus. Serv. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 1997). No deference is given to the 
trial court's decision. 
This issue was preserved by the Goebels' filing their Memorandum in 
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 3798-3919 (see especially 
R. 3806-08)); at oral argument (held June 4, 2002) on that Motion (the proceedings of 
that hearing have not been transcribed); by the District Court's bench ruling (R. 6759, 
Tr. 6-7) granting that Motion; and by the District Court's entry of its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. R. 5773-80. 
6 
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III. STATUTES AND ORDINANCE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
• Utah Code Ann. $10-7-26(2) 
• Utah Code Ann. §10-7-29 
• Salt Lake City Ordinance §14.44.030 
• Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 
• Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 
• Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 
Please see pages 001-003 of the Addendum hereto for language of the statutes 
and ordinance. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDING. 
This Appeal is from rulings, orders, and a judgment in this negligence/personal 
injury/loss-of-consortium action. The Goebels settled with three parties (Omni 
Products, Inc. ("Omni"), Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"), and 
UTA), prior to trial. The District Court granted a motion for directed verdict, at the 
close of all the evidence, in favor of one of the appellees, Southern. The District Court 
had earlier ruled that the Goebels could not pursue, under Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11, 
claims other than public nuisance claims. The District Court also granted summary 
judgment in favor of the other appellee, the City. This Appeal is primarily from those 
three rulings. The Goebels also appeal, for purposes of the new trial to be held herein, 
from certain additional rulings (discussed in Issues Nos. 3, 4, and 5, at pages 4-6, 
above). 
7 
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B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND BRIEF HISTORY OF 
PROCEEDINGS. 
On February 19, 1998, Mr. Goebel sustained a "terrible"3 spinal cord injury in a 
bicycle accident. He had been riding his road bicycle westbound on 1700 South Street 
in Salt Lake City. He somersaulted and landed on his helmeted head while he was in 
the process of traversing the railroad crossing at approximately 200 West. The front 
wheel of his bicycle entered a gap, essentially parallel with the direction he was 
traveling, that ran between two adjacent pads of the rubber crossing surface that was 
then in place. E.g., R. 6766, Tr. 864-65. 
The gap appears in the lower part of the two "videograbs" (still images from a 
videotape) enlarged versions of which comprise Ex. P-10. That videotape (Ex. P-12) 
was taken on March 14, 1998. A reduced-size version of Ex. P-10 appears in the 
Addendum hereto at 077. 
If he had not had to avoid a hump or "protuberance" (Mr. Goebel's term) that 
extended to within two feet of the outermost rail at the crossing, the bicycle wheel 
3
 This is the characterization used by Southern's counsel in his opening statement. R. 
6762, Tr. 43. Mr. Goebel's stipulated medical expenses were, at the time of trial, 
$211,161.36. R. 6762, Tr. 94-95. The nature of his injury and some of his problems 
were explained by, among others, Dr. Jeff Randle, one of his treating physicians. R. 
6763, Tr. 248-85. Some of the effects the injury have had on him and his relationship 
with his wife, plaintiff-appellant Kathy Goebel, are explained in Ms. Goebel's 
testimony. R. 6767, Tr. 1122-1161. His economic loss expert testified (R. 6764, Tr. 
529) that the trial-time present value of Mr. Goebel's economic damages alone 
substantially exceeded 2 million dollars. 
8 
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would have had no occasion to enter the gap. R. 6765, Tr. 661. 
The rubber crossing pads had been manufactured by a predecessor of Omni. 
The pads had been installed by Union Pacific. The rail line and crossing were owned 
by UTA. The street on which Mr. Goebel had been traveling was owned and, beyond 
two feet from the outermost rails at the crossing, maintained by defendant-appellee the 
City. Defendant-appellee Southern had entered into an Administration and 
Coordination Agreement ("the Agreement") with UTA (Ex. P-44); was in possession 
of the subject railroad crossing pursuant to an easement agreement with Union Pacific 
(E. P-45; R. 6767, Tr. 1119-20); was the only entity running trains over the crossing at 
the time of the subject incident; was, under Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 and Salt Lake 
City Ordinance §14.44.030, responsible for the safe condition of the crossing surface; 
and was, pursuant to Utah statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§10-7-26(2) and -29), 
responsible for the safe condition of the surface of the roadway up to points that 
extended two feet from the outermost rails at the crossing. 
On September 9, 1999, the Goebels filed their Motion for Leave to File Second 
Amended Complaint (R. 124-48), along with a supporting memorandum (R. 149-51). 
Southern resisted that Motion by memorandum. R. 167-84. The Goebels sought, in a 
reply memorandum (R. 191-201), and at oral argument (not transcribed) (R. 237), to 
convince the District Court that they should be allowed to assert claims based on Utah 
Code Ann. §56-1-11. That statute provides: 
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Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to 
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road. 
The District Court ruled (R. 364) that the Goebels could not pursue non-public 
nuisance claim based on that statutory language for the reason that such claims would 
be superfluous to the Goebels' common law negligence claims. 
On May 15, 2000, the Goebels filed their Second Amended Complaint (R. 520-
41), which included public nuisance (R. 537-38) as well as negligence claims against 
all defendants. 
In or about March 2001, the Goebels settled their claims against Omni. The 
Order of Dismissal of those claims was entered April 9, 2001. R. 811-13. 
On June 4, 2002, the District Court heard oral argument on the Motions for 
Summary Judgment filed by the defendants (Southern, Union Pacific, UTA, and the 
City) that were then still in the case. On or about June 14, 2002 (R. 6759, Tr. 3-7), the 
District Court announced its rulings (formalized at 6497-6500) denying all Motions for 
Summary Judgment except that filed by the City. In granting the City's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the District Court determined that the current version of Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-12(3)(b)(ii)(A), which went into effect on May 4, 1998 (2 Vi 
months after the date the Goebels5 claims arose), was the controlling version, that it 
should be applied retroactively, and that the Goebels' service of the notice of claim on 
the City's mayor and council members (done pursuant to the versions of Utah Code 
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Ann. §§63-30-11 and 63-30-13 that were in effect as of the date that the Goebels' 
claims arose) was defective. 
After the District Court denied Union Pacific's and UTA's Motions for 
Summary Judgment, the Goebels settled their claims against those defendants. The 
orders of dismissal of those claims were entered on August 2, 2002 (R. 6503-04) and 
July 29, 2002. R. 6489-91. 
The Goebels' claims against Southern, the Goebels' target defendant, were tried 
in July of 2002. On July 17 , at the close of all the evidence, Southern (having 
preserved, on the record {e.g., R. 6767, Tr. 1161-62), its procedural right to make such 
a motion) moved for a directed verdict. R. 6760, Tr. 7. 
After oral argument (R. 6760, Tr. 7-33) the District Court took that motion 
under advisement and, on the morning of July 18 , orally granted that motion. R. 
6761, Tr. 1246-53. The District Court's ruling was based on its determination, with 
respect both to the Goebels' common law negligence claim and their public nuisance 
claim, that the Goebels had not produced evidence that Southern knew or should have 
known of the dangerous condition of the crossing or that Southern had a reasonable 
opportunity to cure that dangerous condition.4 The District Court, being of the 
4
 The District Court also determined (R. 6761, Tr. 3-5), in announcing its ruling on 
Southern's motion for directed verdict, that Southern owed the Goebels a duty of care 
under certain Utah statutory provisions and a Salt Lake City ordinance (set forth at 
pages 001-003 of the Addendum) and by reason of Southern's easement with Union 
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expressed view that the standard for summary judgment was different from the 
standard for directed verdict (R. 6760, Tr. 22), took that action although the evidence 
on that aspect of the case came in at trial as it had been developed at the time of the 
summary judgment proceedings, and although the District Court had denied 
Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment on the notice and opportunity to cure basis 
as well as on all of the numerous other bases advanced by Southern.5 
The Goebels filed their Motion for New Trial (R. 6453-54), under Rule 59(a)(7) 
("error in law") of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and supporting memorandum 
(R. 6457-66) on July 22, 2002. On August 29, 2002, the District Court signed its 
Directed Verdict Order (R. 6668-72) and, on that same day, entered Judgment in favor 
of Southern. R. 6673-74. On September 24, 2002, the District Court entered its Order 
Denying the Goebels5 Motion for New Trial. R. 6729-30. 
This Appeal ensued, with the Goebels' Notice of Appeal having been filed, in 
Pacific ("the Easement"), but that Southern owed the Goebels no duty under the 
Agreement between Southern and UTA. 
5
 The District Court did not dispute the proposition, advanced by the Goebels (R. 6760, 
Tr. 9) in their argument in opposition to Southern's motion for directed verdict, that 
the evidence came in as it was projected to come in at the summary judgment stage (in 
the course of denying Southern's Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court 
had observed that there were triable questions of fact on the actual or constructive 
notice and reasonable opportunity to cure aspects of the Goebels' case against 
Southern (R. 6759, Tr. 4)). The District Court expressly ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 10; R. 
6671) that Southern was not entitled to directed verdict on any of the other grounds it 
had advanced. 
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the District Court, in timely fashion (with respect to both the Judgment and the Order 
Denying Motion for New Trial), on September 27, 2002. R. 6731-33. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. THE DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The evidence came in the way it was poised to come in at the summary 
judgment stage. The District Court committed reversible error when it granted 
Southern's motion for directed verdict in the face of substantial evidence, and 
inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom, supporting their claims against Southern. The 
Goebels should clearly be allowed to present their claims against Southern to a new 
jury. 
2. UTAH CODE ANN. §56-1-11. 
The District Court erroneously, by prohibiting the Goebels from pursuing a 
non-public nuisance claim based on Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 (which makes railroad 
companies liable for their "neglect" in failing to "make and maintain good and 
sufficient crossings"), kept the Goebels from being able effectively to argue that 
Southern's notice, actual or constructive, of dangerous conditions at the crossing, was 
not a prerequisite of the success of their case against Southern. The Court should, 
especially if (but not only if) it rejects, for whatever reason, the Goebels' argument 
that the District Court committed reversible error in granting Southern's motion for 
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directed verdict, reverse the District Court's §56-1-11 ruling and allow the Goebels to 
pursue, in the new trial, their claim founded on that statute. 
3. DUTY UNDER THE SOUTHERN-UTA AGREEMENT AND 
§324A. 
The Court should rule, based on the clear language of the Agreement (Ex. P-44) 
between Southern and UTA (appended hereto at 043-76; see especially Sections 3.1 
and 3.3, at pages 050-51 of the Addendum), that Southern contractually undertook the 
duty to maintain the subject crossing area and that, pursuant to Restatement, Second, 
of Torts, §324A, that duty ran to the Goebels. The District Court should be ordered to 
allow the Goebels to present that theory of liability to the jury in the new trial. 
4. AMBIGUITY OF THE CONTRACT. 
In the event that the Court rejects the Goebels' primary contention with respect 
to the Agreement between Southern and UTA (that it clearly and unequivocally 
imposes on Southern a duty to maintain the crossing for the safe use of those, 
including bicyclists, who cross the tracks perpendicular to the direction of the rails), 
the Court should rule that that Agreement is ambiguous and should, accordingly, allow 
extrinsic evidence, including course of conduct and contract interpretation, by those 
familiar with the genesis of that contract and its administration, to be presented to the 
jury in the new trial. 
5. EMPIRICAL TESTING EVIDENCE. 
The District Court abused is discretion in ruling that the Goebels5 accident 
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reconstruction expert could not explain to the jury, through oral testimony and the use 
of photographs, the empirical testing he did to confirm the proposition that 
Mr. Goebel's bicycle tire could have traveled into the gap between the rubber crossing 
panels. The Court should instruct the District Court to allow such evidence in the new 
trial. 
6. NON-RETRO ACTIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY STATUTORY CHANGE. 
The District Court should have determined that the change in law, which 
required the Goebels to serve their notice of claim on the Salt Lake City Recorder, 
rather than on the "governing body," is to be applied prospectively only. The District 
Court's ruling was erroneous, may be contrary to precedent of this Court, and could 
lead, by reason of principles of subject matter jurisdiction, to untenable results. This 
Court is not bound by statute or any of its previous rulings to uphold the District 
Court's ruling and should reverse that ruling and allow the Goebels to take their case 
against the City to trial. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GRANTING SOUTHERN'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At approximately 11:30 a.m., on Thursday, July 18, 2002, eight trial jurors and 
two alternates emerged, unhappy and confused, into the Fourth Floor (West Wing) 
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hallway of the Matheson Courthouse. They had just spent an hour and a half (see R. 
6767, Tr. 1209; R. 6761, Tr. 12-13) being debriefed by the District Court trial judge 
about their jury experience. They spent the next hour and a half discussing the case 
with George and Kathy Goebel and their legal counsel, still trying to understand how 
and why the directed verdict could have been lawful or just and how Utah law could 
prevent them, after they had heard and seen what they had heard and seen in the 
evidence, from being given the opportunity to award substantial damages to the 
Goebels. 
The prospective jurors came to court to fill out questionnaires on Monday, 
July 8 . They were in Court all day Tuesday, July 9 , while the jury selection process 
was being completed. They sat through six days of evidence. At the conclusion of all 
the evidence, when all that was left to be done was settling on the jury instructions, 
instructing the jury, arguments of counsel, and jury deliberations, the District Court 
took the case from them. 
The waste of judicial resources, the disappointment to the jurors (who labored 
conscientiously throughout the trial and who looked forward, with enthusiasm, to 
playing their roles in the administration of justice), the expense to the Goebels, and the 
effort expended by counsel, by the District Court, and by the District Court's 
personnel in the exercise of selecting the jury and trying the case are things that 
probably cannot now be compensated in any meaningful way. 
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The District Court was erroneously of the view that different standards govern 
motions for summary judgment and motions for directed verdict. Especially given the 
stage of the trial proceedings that had been reached, the District Court should, even if 
it was inclined to grant that motion, have taken it under advisement and let the jury do 
its job and then determine, if the verdict was in favor of the Goebels, whether to grant 
that motion or a post-judgment motion brought by Southern under Rule 50(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Now, however, the Goebels face not only this Appeal 
but another lengthy trial. Meanwhile, Mr. Goebel's health is, as a result of his 
catastrophic spinal cord injury, which rendered him an "incomplete" quadriplegic, 
further deteriorating. He has had additional surgery and he is enduring even greater 
pain and disability than he was at the time of trial. This Court cannot undo all the 
harm that the District Court's directed verdict ruling did to the Goebels, but it can and 
should, regardless of how it handles the other issues in this Appeal, rule that the 
District Court erred in granting Southern's motion for directed verdict, and decree that 
a new trial be held as soon as possible. 
For six separate reasons, any one of which will suffice for reversal, the District 
Court committed reversible error in granting Southern's motion for directed verdict. A 
discussion of those reasons follows. 
2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROTUBERANCE 
The uncontroverted evidence was that the protuberance went right up to the 
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easternmost surface of the crossing. R. 6765, Tr. 661-62, 697. The protuberance was 
a foreseeable (e.g., R. 6065-70; 6095-96) roadway feature that Mr. Goebel had had to 
avoid for over nine months (R. 6765, Tr. 655, 674), while it was in the same condition. 
R. 6765, Tr. 655, 713-14. The surface of the crossing extended only 22 inches east 
from the easternmost rail. (See Ex. P-58, an enlargement of a diagram (small copy 
attached at 078 of the Addendum hereto) of the part of the crossing that included the 
subject gap and parts of the westernmore pair of rails (R. 6765, Tr. 768-69; 784-88) 
made by David Ingebretsen, the Goebels' liability expert, after it had been removed 
from the scene. The rest of the crossing surface had been demolished by the time 
Mr. Ingebretsen made that diagram. It is apparent, from a review of a videotape (Ex. 
P-12) that was made on March 14, 1998, less than a month after the date of the 
incident, and from a photo (Ex. D-4; small copy of the enlarged photograph is attached 
at 079 of the Addendum hereto) taken before the crossing was removed in July or 
August 1998, that the width of the panels around the eastemmore pair of rails (21 lA") 
was the same width as those around the westernmore pair of rails (where the subject 
gap was located) and that the distance from the rails to the panels is the same for the 
westernmore pair of rails QA") as it is for the eastemmore pair. And there was, in any 
event, oral testimony that those things appeared to be the same. R. 6765, Tr. 788-89.) 
Accordingly, and pursuant to the "2-foot" rule set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§§10-7-26(2) and -29 (pertinent language of those statutes is set forth in the 
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Addendum, at 001), Salt Lake Southern shared responsibility, with the City,6 for the 
existence of and hazardous condition of that protuberance. The District Court 
correctly ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 3-4; R. 6669) that Southern owed the Goebels duties of 
care under those statutes. Southern, which had been operating over the tracks since 
1993 (when the Agreement (Ex. P-44) and the Easement (Ex. P-45) were executed, 
and which had been inspecting the tracks since at least January of 1998 (R.6065-68; 
6166; 6175)), had, at least as a matter fit for jury determination, constructive notice of 
the presence of the protuberance and had had such constructive notice for at least the 
nine-month period that Mr. Goebel had been riding a bicycle to work and had been 
observing and avoiding that protuberance. R. 6765, Tr. 661-65. The uncontroverted 
testimony, from two City street department employees (R. 6763, Tr. 287-89; Tr. 296-
300), was that humps of any size in a roadway, like potholes of any size in the 
roadway, present hazardous conditions, not only if they are contacted by users of the 
roadway, including bicyclists, but also if, by reason of avoiding such hazards, users of 
the roadway, including bicyclists, come into contact with other hazards. There can be 
no doubt, at least as a matter fit for jury determination, that if Mr. Goebel had not had 
to veer from his normal riding course (very close to the right of the "fog line" to the 
6
 Mr. Goebel testified that the protuberance, which went right up to the easternmost 
part of the crossing surface (R. 6765, Tr. 662, 697) was 4 inches long, east to west (R. 
6765, Tr. 662), meaning that it extended to a distance of 26 inches from the 
easternmost rail. There was no contrary evidence. 
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right of the roadway (R. 6765, Tr. 661)) to avoid the protuberance, the front wheel of 
his new, more narrow-wheeled bicycle (he had ridden that bike only two or three 
times) (R. 6765, Tr. 669-70) would have had no occasion to drop into the gap and he 
would not have been injured. See, for a visual explanation, Ex. P-54, the scene 
diagram made before the section of the crossing was removed. It shows the fog line 
and the gap in question. A smaller version of that diagram appears in the Addendum 
hereto at 080. The irregularly shaped oval, marked "Protuberance," has been drawn, 
on the appended version, by the Goebels5 counsel, in an attempt to mimic what 
Mr. Goebel drew on the actual exhibit. Mr. Goebel5s counsel has also written in, on 
the appended version, "Fog Line" and "Subject Gap." 
As the Goebels' counsel unsuccessfully sought to explain (R. 6760, Tr. 19-21; 
28-32) to the District Court at the time Southern's motion for directed verdict was 
being argued, it has never been essential to the Goebels' claim regarding the 
protuberance (a stand-apart dangerous condition, and without which condition there is 
no reason to think Mr. Goebel would have encountered the gap), that Southern had to 
have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the gap. By way of 
analogy, if, in the process of his avoiding the protuberance, Mr. Goebel had struck a 
vehicle or a vehicle had struck him, Southern could still be held liable, as a matter of 
triable fact, for the condition of the protuberance itself; and the vehicle strike could 
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(analogous to the gap) be considered, as a matter of triable fact, another proximate 
cause of his injury and damages. 
Proximate cause is a factual issue which in most cases may not appropriately be 
resolved as a matter of law. E.g., Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 
615 (Utah 1985); Godeskv v. Provo City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1984); 
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984). Utah law 
recognizes a party's entitlement to have a jury decide a party's claim unless it appears 
that, even upon the facts claimed by that party, he or she could not establish a basis for 
recovery. Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978). "[W]hen there is 
doubt about the matter, it should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to 
trial." Id. "[C]ourts should refuse to grant a directed verdict on issues of causation if 
there is any evidence which might lead a reasonable jury to find a causal connection 
between a breach and a subsequent injury." Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 938 
(Utah 1999). 
The District Court appears (R. 6761, Tr. 8-9; R. 6670) to have been of the 
clearly erroneous view that there can be but one proximate cause of an accident and 
that, here, that cause was the gap alone. The District Court erroneously invaded the 
province of the jury when it (having expressed utterly no disagreement with the 
proposition that Southern had constructive notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure 
the condition of the protuberance) ruled that the protuberance, although it "may very 
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well be a factor in this incident," was not a proximate cause of the accident. Id. 
The District Court erred in taking the case from the jury. The long-standing 
existence of the protuberance, Southern's duty to concern itself with the protuberance, 
Mr. Goebel's having altered his path to avoid it, and the consequent travel of his 
bicycle into the gap should, based on well-established Utah law, clearly have caused 
the District Court to deny Southern's motion for directed verdict. 
3. SOUTHERN'S AFFIRMATIVE STATUTORY AND 
ORDINANCE-BASED DUTIES 
The District Court correctly ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 3-4), just prior to granting 
Southern's motion for directed verdict, that Southern was a "railway company" 
pursuant to Utah statutory and Salt Lake City ordinance law and owed the Goebels 
legal duties pursuant to those safety laws. Those safety laws do not contemplate, as a 
requirement for their violation, actual or even constructive notice of dangerous 
conditions. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-26(2) provides that every railway company must keep 
every portion of every street used by it and upon or across which tracks are 
constructed in good and safe condition for public travel. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-29 provides that the tracks of all railway companies 
when located upon the streets of a city shall be kept in repair and safe in all respects, 
for the use of the traveling public. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance §14.44.030 provides that every railway company 
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operating within the boundaries of Salt Lake City shall keep every portion of every 
street upon or across which its tracks are maintained in good and safe condition to 
accommodate public travel. 
As stated in McQuillin. Municipal Corporations §24.721: "Generally, 
violations by a railroad of its duty under an ordinance with respect to crossing 
constitutes, or at least gives evidence of, actionable negligence." That basic legal 
precept is clearly applicable here. This Court, in a street railway negligence case, 
Oswald v. Utah L.&R. Co.. 117 P. 46, 47 (Utah 1911), explained: 
The law as provided by the ordinance prescribed some conduct for the 
defendant. Courts have declared that the omission or commission of something 
in violation of a valid statute, or of any ordinance reasonable in its terms, is 
negligence, or evidence of negligence. 
In cases in which statutes set forth affirmative duties for railroads and in cases in 
which railroad duties are statutorily imposed, it is not necessary, for a railway 
company to be found liable, that it have actual knowledge or a reasonable opportunity 
to have obtained knowledge of an unsafe condition. E.g., York v. Pennsylvania R. 
Co., 56 N.E.2d 341 (Ohio App. 1943); Moreland v. Director-General 114 A. 424,425 
(NJ. 1921); Louisville. N.A. & C.R. Co. v. Red. 47 111. App. 662, 664-65 (1893). 
Although in Utah violation of a safety statute is not necessarily per se 
negligence (see, e.g., MUJI 3.11), the principle, for purposes of this discussion (the 
non-necessity of showing actual or constructive notice), is the same under Utah law. 
See also MUJI 8.8, which is based on Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co.. 171 P. 999,1002 
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(Utah 1918) and which provides (without mentioning a requirement of notice): 
Railroad and railway companies have a duty to maintain good and sufficient 
crossing surfaces. In other words, they must keep the crossing reasonably safe 
for the traveling public to travel over, keeping in mind the location, whether in 
a sparsely settled or populous locality, and the character and volume of traffic 
that ordinarily may be expected to pass over the crossing. 
The upshot of all this is that a showing of actual or constructive notice is not 
required in a situation where an applicable statute or ordinance putting an affirmative 
duty on a railway company is involved. It was error for the District Court, in these 
circumstances, to direct a verdict based on Southern's supposed lack of actual or 
constructive notice. 
4. SOUTHERN'S PRESUMED KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
HAZARDOUS CONDITION OF THE GAP 
Another basis for reversal, independent of those regarding the protuberance and 
the statutes and ordinance discussed above is that, within the contemplation of 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1986), the condition of the 
gap was "permanent." In other words, it was not a transitory or sudden condition 
7
 In Schnuphase, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent 
nature, such as: in the structure of a building, or of a stairway, etc. or in 
equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use, which was created or chosen 
by the defendant (or his agents), or for which he is responsible. In such 
circumstances, where the defendant either created the condition, oris 
responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof 
of notice is necessary. 
918 P.2d at 478 (emphasis added). 
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such as the presence of snow or ice on a sidewalk, or the presence of a jalapeno, a 
kiwi, or any other "foreign substance" on the floor of a supermarket, or street lights 
going out. The evidence at trial was that gaps between rubber crossing panels develop 
and enlarge predictably (but not infinitely) over time, rather than going from being 
non-existent one day and 3A inch wide (the approximate size of the subject gap (e.g., R. 
6762, Tr. 180)) the next day. E.g., R. 6065-70; 6115; 6200; 6204-05. (There was also 
evidence, from Omni's Ron Nutting, a most knowledgeable man, that such gaps 
"stabilize" in size (R. 6065-70; 6115); that he has seen no gaps bigger than 3A inch (R. 
6065-70; 6094; 6117) and that gaps 3A inch wide present foreseeable hazards to 
bicyclists. R. 6065; 6104-05.) 
At least as a matter of triable fact, the jury should have been allowed to 
consider the conduct of Southern, an entity (in the words of Schnuphase), 
"responsible" for the condition of the surface of the crossing, in not only failing to 
observe and correct the size of the gap once it reached a size large enough to 
accommodate a bicycle wheel, but also in allowing it to get to such a critical size in the 
first place. This situation is analogous to that of a building owner that allows rot in a 
structure to reach a critical point where it becomes dangerous. Like rot, enlargement 
of gaps is, as explained above, a progressive (although the gap size will ultimately 
"stabilize"), not sudden, process. With respect to one "responsible" for a "permanent" 
condition, such as building structures and gaps, there is no reason that the duty of 
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reasonable care should be held to begin only when that condition has already reached a 
critically dangerous point. 
Southern can be held liable, at least as a matter of triable fact, for its abject 
failure to have acted on the gap, in one fashion or another, before it got critically wide, 
by either filling the gap (see, e.g., R. 6065-70; 6109-10) or removing and reinstalling 
some of the rubber pads {e.g., R. 6065-68; 6200; 6209). This duty exists apart from its 
duty to remedy the problem promptly after it had reached critical size. 
In Gilton v. Hestonville M & F.P.R. Co.. 31 Atl. 249, 250 (Pa. 1895), a most 
instructive case that squarely supports the Goebels' contention for application of the 
"permanent condition" rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, in the course of 
i 
reversing a "nonsuit" entered by the trial court on the basis that the defendant railroad 
company did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition: 
The defect in the rail did not occur suddenly or from an unusual or accidental , 
cause; it was the result of ordinary and long-continued use; it was apparent and 
the danger from it probable. ... [The railroad company] was bound to know 
that use and that climatic influences would produce defects in the rails .... The 
defects in the rail in question did not arise in a day, nor probably in a week or a 
month. The certainty that they would arise in time imposed the duty of
 { 
continued vigilance. 
The District Court erred in rejecting the Goebels' argument regarding the 
"permanent" nature of the gap hazard. This Court should determine that the hazard < 
was "permanent" and should rule, accordingly, that the Goebels did not need to prove 
Southern's actual or constructive notice of that hazard to carry their case to the jury. 
i 
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5. SOUTHERN'S CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE 
DANGEROUS NATURE OF THE GAP ONCE IT REACHED A 
SIZE SUFFICIENT TO ACCOMMODATE A BICYCLE TIRE 
Still another, stand-apart basis on which the Court should reverse the District 
Court and order a new trial is the District Court's error in rejecting (R. 6760, Tr. 15-
16) the Goebels' argument that, given the evidence that gaps do not develop suddenly, 
and given the evidence that the crossing had been in place since 1986 (R. 6767, Tr. 
1119) (more than eleven years; more than 4,000 days), it was at least a matter of fair 
jury inference that the gap had existed in its critical size for a period of time sufficient 
to put Southern on constructive notice of the dangerous nature of the gap. See, also, 
the discussion appearing, and record citations set forth, at p. 25, above, regarding the 
approximately 3A inch width of the gap and the "stabilization" evidence. 
The fact that there was no evidence that anyone had in fact noticed the gap to be 
of a dangerous width is not determinative of the question. Indeed, given the testimony 
by John Martinez, Southern's track inspector that, to his knowledge, Southern had no 
one who was actually inspecting crossings to see if they were safe (R. 6065-68; 6167; 
6178) and his acknowledgment that he didn't even think about the safety of bicyclists 
(R. 6065-68; 6167; 6194) (although he agreed that he had a responsibility to concern 
himself with the safety of bicyclists) (R. 6189), it is no surprise that no one actually 
noticed the gap. The District Court demanded something from the Goebels that, given 
the fact that Southern was not actively inspecting for gaps dangerous to bicyclists, and 
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given the fact that bicyclists were not likely to notice the existence of gaps (see 
discussion in following paragraph), was virtually impossible to provide. 
Constructive notice (meaning that Southern could, by the exercise of reasonable 
care, have discovered the dangerous condition) is, under this part of the case analysis, 
all that is required. The fact that Mr. Goebel, who had traversed the crossing over a 
100 times or more (R. 6765, Tr. 658), had not observed any gaps (R. 6765, Tr. 659) is 
not dispositive. Though he had a duty to exercise due care, he had no duty to see that 
the crossing was safe. He had been riding his new bike, with the narrower wheels, for 
only a few days (R. 6765, Tr. 669-70), and the wheel of his old bike would not have fit 
into the gap. R. 6765, Tr. 780, 806; R. 6765, Tr. 942. Also, the uncontroverted 
testimony is that Mr. Goebel, traveling between 22 Vi and 30 feet per second as he 
traversed the crossing (R. 6765, Tr. 826), with his eyes looking 30-40 feet ahead (R. 
6765, Tr. 674), would likely not notice the gap (see, e.g., the testimony of David 
Stephens (Southern's witness), who was looking for gaps, that from a distance of more 
than 10 or 12 feet back, gaps were difficult, if not impossible, to perceive). R. 6767, 
Tr. 1195-96; 1205. 
It is not merely speculation on the Goebels' part that the gap existed in a 
dangerous size for a period long enough to enable Southern to have had constructive 
8
 Lest there be any confusion, the Goebels point out that the uncontroverted testimony 
was that the tires on the bike Mr. Goebel was riding at the time of the incident are not 
extraordinarily narrow. R. 6763, Tr. 351-52. 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure the problem. The jury could reasonably 
have drawn that inference. 
In Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 479 P.2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972), this Court 
explained: 
Jurors may not speculate as to the possibilities; they may, however, make 
justifiable inferences from circumstantial evidence to find negligence or 
proximate cause. 
The jury would have been required to speculate « given the length of time that 
the crossing surface had been in place — to reach the conclusion that the gap had 
developed to a dangerous size only at a time so close to the time of the incident that 
Southern should not, in the exercise of reasonable care, have noticed it and remedied 
it. Southern's track inspections were done over the entire length of the UTA line, 
including the subject crossing. R. 6767, Tr. 1170-72. As. Mr. Goebel's counsel 
sought (R. 6760, Tr. 15-16) unsuccessfully to explain to the District Court, it defies the 
law of probability to suggest that the gap got to the critical size (wide enough to accept 
Mr. Goebel's bike tire) only within the three days that went by between the time 
Southern's Mr. Martinez did his track inspection, on February 16, 1998 (penultimate 
page of Ex. P-33) and the date of the incident. And Mr. Martinez in fact did another 
track inspection on February 17th (see the last page of Ex. P.-33; a copy of that exhibit 
appears in the Addendum at 036-42), only two days before the incident. 
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The District Court erred in taking the case from the jury regarding Southern's 
constructive notice of the gap just as it erred in taking the case from the jury on the 
other discrete aspects of the Goebels' argument discussed hereinabove. 
6. THE PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM. 
The Goebels asserted and presented at trial a public nuisance claim in addition 
to their common law negligence claim. One of the agreed-upon jury instructions (R. 
5904) embodies the Goebels' and Southern's agreement as to how the law of public 
nuisance applies to this case. That instruction, which tracks Utah Code Ann. §76-10-
803, provides as follows: 
Creating or maintaining a public nuisance is unreasonably doing any act or 
omitting to perform any duty, which act or omission: 
1. Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of 
three or more persons; 
2. Interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders dangerous 
for passage, any street or highway; or 
3. In any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use
 { 
of property. 
An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified in this 
instruction is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of annoyance and 
regardless of whether the damage inflicted on individuals is unequal. 
Southern acknowledged (R. 843), in its successful effort to keep the Goebels from 
asserting a claim of strict, or per se, public nuisance liability, that the elements of non-
strict liability public nuisance are different from those necessary to be proved in claims y 
of common law negligence. Southern then contended, in the course of oral argument 
on its motion for directed verdict, that actual or constructive notice is an element of 
30 
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public nuisance claims, just like it is of common law negligence claims, and that, 
therefore, Southern's supposed lack of actual or constructive notice of the gap doomed 
the Goebels' public nuisance claim just as it purportedly doomed the Goebels5 
common law negligence claim. R. 6760, Tr. 26-27. The District Court erroneously 
agreed with Southern. R. 6761, Tr. 9; R. 6671. 
No Utah public nuisance case that has come to the attention of the Goebels' 
counsel even discusses the concept of proof of a defendant's notice as a prerequisite to 
the success of a plaintiff s public nuisance tort claim. Prosser's Handbook of the Law 
tin 
of Torts (4 Ed. 1971) does not even mention, in its discussion of Public Nuisance 
law, at 583-91, the concept of notice. For a discussion of Utah public nuisance law see 
Erickson v. Sorensen, 877 P.2d 144 (Utah App. 1994). There the divided Court of 
Appeals panel (or at least Judge Orme) restated the rule that, in the absence of 
circumstances justifying application of per se public nuisance liability, it is necessary 
to prove that the defendant's conduct is "unreasonable" and that a showing of 
"negligent" conduct is acceptable proof. Id. at 149-50. Notice was not an issue in 
Erickson. It would be erroneous for this Court to conclude, as the District Court did 
(R. 6761, Tr. 9; R. 6671), that, in the context of public nuisance law, notice is a 
requisite part of the "negligent" prong of unreasonable conduct. For if it were, what 
would be the point of there being a public nuisance cause of action? This Court should 
put semantics aside and rule that a showing of actual or constructive notice need not be 
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made to prove that public nuisance conduct - by act or omission - is "negligently" 
unreasonable. The inquiry - and it is for the jury - should be whether, in all the 
circumstances, including Southern's abject lack of concern for the safety of bicyclists 
(R. 6065-68; 6166; 6178; 6194), and in light of the proposition that Southern's very 
lack of concern caused it to allow the gaps to remain undetected and unaddressed 
through the time of the incident, the conduct of Southern was unreasonable. 
Southern acknowledged, as stated above, that the elements of public nuisance 
are not the same as those of common law negligence. Most interestingly, as things 
turn out, at least one difference is that a public nuisance-claim plaintiff does not need 
to prove notice. Southern, having obtained advantage in this litigation by convincing 
the District Court that the Goebels could not pursue a per se public nuisance claim, 
erroneously argued, in support of its directed verdict motion, that notice was required. 
This Court should reverse the directed verdict on this and the other grounds discussed 
above and should make it clear that, in the new trial to be held herein, the new jury 
shall be affirmatively informed of the fact that no notice is required with respect to the 
Goebels'public nuisance claim. 
The standard for granting a motion for directed verdict is most stringent. It is, 
contrary to the District Court's expressed view, essentially the same as that governing 
a motion for summary judgment. Nay v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 
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(Utah 1993). "Under Utah law, a party who moves for a directed verdict has the very 
difficult burden of showing that no evidence exists that raises a question of material 
fact" Mahmood v. Ross, 990 P.2d 933, 937 (Utah 1999), quoting from Alta Health 
Strategies, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Serv., 930 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah App. 1996). In 
reviewing a trial court's grant of directed verdict, this Court "reviews the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party and ... afford[s] him the benefit of all 
inferences which the evidence fairly supports." Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462, 463 
(Utah 1979). Here the District Court erroneously failed adequately to consider the 
evidence and the reasonable inferences that the jury could draw from the evidence. 
The Court should recognize that the District Court erred and, in the interest of 
justice and whatever it does with the other issues in this Appeal, order that a new trial 
be held as soon as reasonably possible so that a new jury can decide this case and so 
that the Goebels are not further delayed in obtaining justice for their profound 
damages sustained by reason of an incident that occurred over 5 years ago. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN DETERMINING THAT THE GOEBELS COULD NOT 
PURSUE A NON-PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIM AGAINST 
SOUTHERN BASED ON UTAH CODE ANN. §56-1-11. 
The District Court, at the urging of Southern (R. 168-69; 178-80), ruled (R. 
364), in the context of the Goebels' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended 
Complaint, that the Goebels' proposed claim based on Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 was 
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superfluous to the Goebels' common law negligence claims and would not be allowed 
to be pursued in this litigation. That ruling was erroneous. 
Especially if, but not only if, the Court for some reason upholds the directed 
verdict, it should determine the District Court's refusal to allow the Goebels to pursue 
their claim based on §56-1-11 to be reversible error. The Court should order that, in 
the new trial to be held herein, the Goebels may pursue that theory, as well as their 
other theories against Southern. 
Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 provides: 
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused by its neglect to 
make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of 
travel crosses its road. 
"Neglect" is, as the Goebels unsuccessfully sought to explain to the District 
Court (e.g., R. 196-97), something different from common law "negligence." 
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines "neglect," in its verb usage, as , 
"1 : to give little attention or respect to: DISREGARD 2: to leave undone or unattended to 
esp. through carelessness." It defines "neglect," in its noun usage, as "an act or 
instance of neglecting something." This seems to fit Southern's conduct. See, e.g., the 
acknowledgement of Southern's track inspector, Mr. Martinez, highlighted at pp. 27 
above, that he did not concern himself at all with the safety of bicyclists. See, also, his { 
testimony, also highlighted at p. 27, that, to his knowledge, Southern had no one 
actually inspecting the crossings for safety. There was no such person. 
i 
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In Van Wagoner v Union Pac. R. Co., 186 P.2d 293, 306 (Utah 1947), one of 
the very few reported decisions to discuss §56-1-11, this Court observed, without 
discussing the concept of notice, in a case in which the decedent's vehicle had 
apparently stalled at a railroad crossing and was struck by a train: "... if decedent was 
stalled by holes in the road and the exposure of high rails, his heirs have just 
complaint...." And, in Denkers v. Southern Pac. Co., 171 P. 999 (Utah 1918), the 
only discussion of notice has to do with the proposition that, because of the long-
standing dangerous condition, judgment as a matter of law, in favor of the plaintiff, 
would likely have been in order. Id. at 1002. The Goebels have never yet suggested 
that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
When the District Court, at Southern's behest, refused to allow the Goebels to 
pursue "neglect" claims based on §56-1-11, it erred in its construction of Utah law. 
This Court should rule that claims pursued under §56-1-11 do not require a showing of 
actual or constructive notice as an element of a plaintiff s claim against a railroad. 
This is good public policy, given the thoroughly public nature of railroad crossings; 
and such a ruling would not impose absolute liability. It would simply make it clear 
that railroad companies need to be vigilant with respect to making and keeping 
crossings safe. 
It is instructive that, in VanWagoner, the Court approved, 186 P.2d at 306, the 
use of the following liability instruction, one that deals with the fact-sensitive, §56-1-
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11 concepts of "good" and "sufficient" crossings, without mentioning "notice" or 
"opportunity to cure" or anything like those common law negligence concepts: 
You are further instructed that by the law of this state every railroad company 
owning or operating a railroad is required to make and maintain good and 
sufficient crossings, equal in width to the main travelled portion of the highway, 
at points where any city or town street or public highway crosses its tracks; and 
it is liable for all injuries from neglect of this duty if the party injured is guilty 
of no negligence contributing to such injury. However, the railroad company is 
only obligated to maintain the approaches to the crossing for a distance of two 
feet on the outside of its rail and is not liable for defects in the highway or 
approach to said crossing if said defects are more than two feet from the outside 
of either rail. In this connection you are instructed that a 'good and sufficient 
crossing5 is a crossing that is sufficient and ordinarily safe for the travelling 
public to pass to and fro over, keeping in mind its location, whether in a 
sparsely settled or populous locality, and the character and volume of traffic 
that ordinarily may be expected to pass over it. 
185P.2dat305. 
If a railroad company's notice, actual or constructive, of the dangerous 
condition of is crossing was to be a prerequisite for establishing liability in cases of 
this kind, there is no good reason for the Utah Legislature to have enacted §56-1-11. 
A claim under that statute is not superfluous to a common law negligence claim, and 
this Court should reverse the District Court's ruling that refused to allow the Goebels 
to pursue this aspect of their case against Southern. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN DETERMINING THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
SOUTHERN AND UTA DID NOT CREATE A DUTY OF CARE 
THAT RAN FROM SOUTHERN TO THE GOEBELS. 
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The Agreement between Southern and UTA came into evidence as Ex. P-44. It 
is appended hereto at 043-76. The District Court orally ruled (R. 6765, Tr. 598) that 
that Agreement was unambiguous and (apparently for that reason) did not allow 
extrinsic evidence to come in to explain its meaning; see discussion set forth in 
following Part D of this Argument). It was unclear, until the District Court rendered 
its oral ruling in response to Southern's motion for directed verdict, how the District 
Court's ruling on the non-ambiguity of the contract would cut. That question was 
answered when the District Court ruled (R. 6761, Tr. 51 R 6669)9 that that Agreement 
gave rise to no duty running from Southern to the Goebels. 
Contrary to the District Court's conclusion, Sections 3.1 and 3.3 of the 
Agreement make it clear that Southern contracted with UTA to maintain crossings 
along the line covered by the Agreement, which, as a matter of undisputed fact, 
includes the subject crossing. Section 3.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
... [Southern] shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair, and renew the Freight 
Trackage so as to preserve the present condition of the track, grade crossings 
and signal facilities.... 
Section 3.3 provides, in pertinent part: 
... [Southern] shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair and renew the joint 
trackage .... Nothing herein shall relieve [Southern] of the obligation to 
9
 It is interesting that the District Court referred to the "good Samaritan doctrine," 
something that the Goebels have never advanced in this case. By the process of 
elimination, that must refer to the Goebels' allegation (R. 535) that a duty ran from 
Southern to the Goebels based on that contract and §324A of the Restatement, Second, 
of Torts. 
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perform maintenance, repair and renewal on the joint trackage in a good and 
workman-like manner and in compliance with all applicable laws and 
regulations. 
Southern will likely contend, as it persistently contended in the District Court 
proceedings, that another part of the contract (Section 2.1) means that Southern 
somehow did not undertake what it appears to have undertaken in Sections 3.1 and 3.3 
and that Southern was forbidden from doing anything of the kind that it 
unquestionably did do. Section 2.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
[Southern] shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not conduct, 
directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on the Passenger Trackage or any 
other activity whatsoever on the Right-of-Way that is not necessary to Freight 
Rail Service. 
As evidenced by the testimony of Southern's Mr. Martinez (see R. 6065-68; 6167; 
6183-85) and the fourth and sixth pages of Ex. P-33, Southern maintained and 
repaired, for at least some purposes "unrelated to freight movement" (the linchpin of 
Southern's argument under Section 2.1), crossings along the line. 
The District Court should have ruled that Sections 3.1 and/or 3.3 clearly, and 
despite Southern's argument to the contrary, established a duty to maintain the 
crossing in a reasonable manner. 
Section 324A of the Restatement, Second, of Torts provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
party or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for his physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if 
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(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to a third person, 
or 
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person 
upon the undertaking. 
UTA owned the line, the crossing, and its surface. It is "another" and "the other" for 
purposes of this Restatement provision. Clearly, the Goebels' case fits, as the claims 
of Ms. Alder and Ms. Jones in Alder v. Bayer Corp. 61 P.3d 1068, 1077-78 (Utah 
2002), fit, one or more of the prongs of §324. 
As explained hereinabove, the error by the District Court in finding that no duty 
of care ran from Southern to the Goebels pursuant to the Agreement does not 
constitute reversible error, given the fact that the District Court correctly determined 
(R. 6761, Tr. 3-4; R. 6669) that Southern owed Goebels duties of care under other 
legal concepts. The Court should, nonetheless, address this question so that, in the 
new trial to be held herein, the Goebels can argue the significance of that duty to the 
jury. It may also be important for the Court to address this question because Southern 
intends to convince the Court, in its cross-appeal, that the District Court erroneously 
determined Southern to have the duties of care discussed in note 4 (pp. 11-12) above. 
D. IF THE COURT RULES THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
CONTRACT BETWEEN SOUTHERN AND UTA DOES NOT 
CLEARLY IMPOSE, ON SOUTHERN, A DUTY OF CARE 
RUNNING TO THE GOEBELS, THE COURT SHOULD RULE 
THAT THE CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS AND ALLOW THE 
GOEBELS TO PRESENT EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF ITS 
MEANING. 
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In the event that the Court determines, for whatever reason, and contrary to the 
Goebels' contentions set forth in the immediately foregoing Part C of this Argument, 
that the Agreement does not clearly require Southern to maintain the crossing, the 
Court should determine that the contract is ambiguous. Given the sections relied upon 
by the Goebels (3.1 and 3.3) and the section relied upon by Southern (2.1), it may be 
arguable as to what that contract really required of Southern. The Agreement is 
ambiguous if there are two reasonably plausible interpretations of what it requires 
Southern to do. E.g., Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999). 
If the Court makes the determination that the Agreement is ambiguous, it 
should then, under established Utah law (id.), allow extrinsic evidence to be presented. 
Such extrinsic evidence should include not only what Southern, through Mr. Martinez, 
did but also evidence of the kinds the Goebels sought unsuccessfully to introduce at 
the trial of this case, including testimony from Crosby Mecham, the UTA point man 
for the Agreement and its administration, regarding his understanding of the contract 
and the course of conduct of the parties under that contract. R. 6363, Tr. 657-79; R. 
6764, Tr. 587-604. The Court should also rule that the District Court erred in 
excluding documents evidencing how UTA and Southern interpreted and applied the 
contract, including proposed Exhibits 76 and 77, as well as other explanatory 
documents, including proposed Exhibits 46 and 47. Evidence of this part of the 
history between Southern and UTA will be important in assisting the jury to 
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understand who undertook and sought to discharge what duties and also may have a 
bearing on the jury's ultimate determination as to whether UTA, in addition to 
Southern, had causal fault, and the respective percentages of causal fault of those two 
entities. The Court should, especially if it rejects the contention that, as a matter of 
law, the contract put a duty on Southern that ran to the Goebels, allow such extrinsic 
evidence to be presented to the jury in the new trial.I0 
E. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW THE GOEBELS TO PRESENT 
EVIDENCE OF THE EMPIRICAL TESTING DONE BY THEIR 
ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION EXPERT.11 
The District Court refused (R. 6766, Tr. 849) the Goebels5 attempt to present 
evidence of empirical testing done by their accident reconstruction expert, offered for 
the purpose of making even more compelling his opinion regarding incident causation, 
10
 If the Court accepts the Goebels5 primary argument regarding the Agreement (see 
part C of the Agreement), it should still direct the District Court to allow, in the new 
trial, Mr. Mecham to give testimony regarding such things as how and why the 
Agreement came into existence and who did what in connection with its performance. 
For that testimony will likely have bearing on the respective percentages of causal 
fault of UTA (if any) and Southern. 
11
 NOTE: This part of the case has its genesis in Southern's denial that Mr. Goebel's 
bike wheel even entered a gap in the crossing surface pads. A reading of the District 
Court's ruling (R. 6761, Tr. 9), made in the context of Southern's motion for directed 
verdict, and formalized in the District Court's Directed Verdict Order (R. 6670), 
suggests that the District Court, after considering all the evidence, rejected that part of 
Southern's defense. If Southern concedes, or if this Court rules, that it is now an 
established fact that Mr. Goebel's bike's front wheel entered an east-west running gap 
between pads that constituted part of the subject crossing surface, the Court need not 
consider this part of the Argument. 
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Although that expert, David Ingebretsen, was appropriately allowed to offer his 
opinion with respect to the proposition that Mr. Goebel's somersault began when his 
bike wheel entered the subject gap {e.g., R. 6766, Tr. 864-65), the fact that that 
testimony came in should not have caused the District Court to conclude that 
Mr. Ingebretsen was unable to testify regarding his empirical testing and the results of 
that testing. As explained prior to the District Court's ruling (R. 6766, Tr. 840-47), the 
testing that Mr. Ingebretsen did was with an exemplar bicycle, and then with 
Mr. Goebel's bicycle itself, with gaps of the approximate size of the gap in question. 
Because Southern has contended throughout the course of this litigation, and is 
expected so to contend in the new trial, that Mr. Goebel's bicycle wheel could not 
have gone into the gap in question {e.g., R. 6761, Tr. 62-64 (Southern's counsel's 
opening statement); R. 6766, Tr. 1037 (testimony from Southern's accident 
reconstruction expert)), the District Court should be ordered to allow the Goebels to 
present the evidence in question. There was nothing improper or (contrary to the 
District Court's expressed concern; R. 6766, Tr. 849) potentially misleading about the 
proposed testimony. Evidence of the testing would have been of assistance to the jury, 
and the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to allow it. That abuse of 
discretion is cast into even sharper focus by the fact that the District Court, after 
making that ruling, determined (R. 6766, Tr. 920-22), over the Goebels' objection, to 
allow evidence of Southern's accident reconstruction expert's experiment that 
42 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
involved conditions unlike the conditions of the subject incident. R. 6766, Tr. 912-14. 
The District Court clearly abused its discretion in disallowing the Goebels' 
proposed empirical testing evidence, and this Court should order that, in the new trial 
to be held herein, the District Court should allow it. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GRANTING SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
1. NATURE OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE CITY. 
The easternmost edge of the crossing surface was only 22 inches east of the 
easternmost rail. See discussion at p. 18, above. The protuberance that Mr. Goebel 
had to avoid, and in the absence of which he would not (at least as a matter of triable 
fact) have encountered the subject gap, extended approximately 4 inches eastward 
from the easternmost edge of the crossing surface. R. 6765, Tr. 662. These facts 
implicate not only Southern's duty to maintain the crossing to a distance of 2 feet 
outside the easternmost rail but also the duty of the City to maintain and repair the 
road surface more than 2 feet outside that rail. The City has acknowledged that duty. 
R. 2648; 2656. 
2. CONTRARY TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING, THE 
1998 AMENDMENTS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED 
RETROACTIVELY, THE GOEBELS COMPLIED WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT, AND THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED TO THE CITY. 
43 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Goebels acknowledge that Utah appellate law, especially the most recent 
cases dealing with the subject, make it clear that the Governmental Immunity Act 
demands strict compliance with its provisions.12 As the following discussion will 
show, however, the Goebels have, contrary to the District Court's ruling, met the test. 
On the date of the incident, February 19, 1998, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
11 (3)(b) provided, in pertinent part: "The notice of claim shall be: ... (ii) directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental entity according to the requirements of §63-
30-12 or §63-30-13." Section 63-30-13 is the pertinent one of those two sections 
inasmuch as Salt Lake City is a political subdivision and not the State of Utah itself. 
Section 63-30-13 provided, as of the date of the incident: 
A claim against a political subdivision ... is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises.... 
(Emphasis added.) The Goebels' notice of claim was directed to, served upon, and 
"filed with" DeeDee Corradini, the Salt Lake City Mayor at the time, and the "Salt 
Lake City Council and All Members of the Salt Lake City Council." R. 45-46. The 
notice of claim was received by Mayor Corradini and the Salt Lake City Council and 
its members on August 12, 1998. R. 3914. The claim was promptly denied. R. 47. 
There can be no doubt that the Mayor and the City Council constituted the "governing 
12
 The Goebels are not appealing the District Court's decision (R. 6759, Tr. 7-8; R. 
5776) that the notice of claim against the City was defective with respect to 
Ms. Goebel's loss-of-consortium claim. 
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body" of the City as of the date the claim arose. 
The current version of §63-30-11(3), on which the City relies, and which 
requires service to be made on the Salt Lake City Recorder, was not passed until 
February 23, 1998, was not approved until March 14, 1998, and did not become 
effective until May 4, 1998. See excerpt from the proceedings of the 1998 General 
Legislative Session. R. 3916. 
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-3 provides: "No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared." (Emphasis added.) There is no declaration 
anywhere in the subject 1998 legislation that its provisions are retroactive. It would 
seem, only this deep in the analysis, obvious that the 1998 amendments should not be 
applied retroactively and that the District Court erred in its ruling. The complexity of 
this issue arises because this Court, in a line of cases including Roark v. Crabtree, 893 
P.2d 1058, 1059 (Utah 1995), and Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
947 P.2d 671, 675-76 (Utah 1997), has developed a body of law that deals with the 
distinction between changes in the law that are "substantive" versus those that are 
"procedural only." The idea is that statutory changes that deal with the substance of 
claims or defenses will be applied prospectively only and that those that deal only with 
the workings of the legal machinery will be applied retroactively. That distinction, 
although easily stated, has sometimes proved difficult in application. See, Washington 
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Ass'n, 795 P.2d 665, 668, n. 4 (Utah App. 1990). 
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The Court should consider, in connection with the question of whether the 
pertinent 1998 amendments are to be applied retroactively, the case of Schultz v. 
Conger, 755 P.2d 165 (Utah 1988). There the Court observed, in the course of 
reversing a trial court order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint for failure to comply 
with the notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act: 
It should be noted that in 1987 the legislature amended §63-30-11 to require the 
filing of a notice of a claim whether the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental or non-governmental. That amendment, 
however, does not apply to the instant case where the claim arose in 1984. 
(Emphasis added.) That observation may or may not be dispositive of the Court's 
consideration of the issue. If the Court determines that the statutory change mentioned 
in Schultz was no more "merely procedural" than are the pertinent 1998 amendments, 
the rule of stare decisis would seem to dictate reversal. The Goebels acknowledge, 
however, that the matter of whether a notice of claim needs to be served at all (the 
question in Schultz) may for some reason be deemed, although both changes are at 
least in part conceptually "procedural," to be more "substantive" than is the matter of 
on whom notice must be served. The Goebels contend that the one change is as 
"substantive" as the other, and that they are entitled, under Schultz, to reversal. The 
Goebels, acknowledging that the Court may disagree with that contention, suggest an 
alternative analytical construct. This Court is free to fine-tune its "substantive" vs. 
"procedural" framework when a case comes along that may not fit neatly, or 
completely, into either category; and it is free to develop non-conflicting but 
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complementary law dealing with the realities of situations its earlier case law may not 
have contemplated. The new reality of the situation here has to do with subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Consider where the District Court's ruling potentially leads. Suppose 
Mr. Goebel had served the notice of claim on the City Recorder and that he was thus 
clearly in compliance with the law not only as of the date the claim arose (assuming 
the City Recorder was part of the "governing body" ~ not an obvious conclusion prior 
to the statutory change), but also as of the date of service of the notice. Suppose the 
Governmental Immunity Act is then amended again, more than a year after the claim 
has arisen, to require service on a different City employee (a notion that is not at all 
fanciful). Mr. Goebel could then be checkmated, under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13, 
which requires service of notices of claim within one year after claims arise, with 
respect to his claim against the City. This is because a party's failure strictly to 
comply with the Governmental Immunity Act deprives the Utah courts of subject 
matter jurisdiction (e.g., Greene v. Utah Transit Authority,13 37 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Utah 
2001)) and because a defense based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised 
at any time {e.g., Barnard v. Wasserman, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1993)). No plaintiff 
in a claim against a Utah governmental entity could ever rest assured that his or her 
13
 Ms. Greene's injury was sustained on September 21, 1998. 37 P.3d at 1157. Her 
claim, unlike Mr. Goebel's, thus arose after the 1998 amendments went into effect. 
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notice of claim would remain in compliance with the law, and no judgment against a 
Utah governmental entity would truly ever be final, if the Court should agree with the 
City's position and the District Court's decision on retroactive application of the 1998 
amendments. Uncertainty would reign. 
That cannot be good law, but that is where the District Court's "procedural 
only" conclusion here leads. For, if amendments to the Governmental Immunity Act 
notice-of-claim requirements are to be applied retroactively, why should the wording 
of the pertinent statutes on the date a notice of claim happens to be served be accorded 
any particular importance? Especially if the Court is of the view that Schultz does not 
dictate the result sought by the Goebels, and especially if the Court thinks it unwise to 
tamper with, or elaborate on, its "substantive vs. procedural" construct, it may wish to 
rule — this is not too remarkable a proposition — that lasting subject matter jurisdiction 
over a party's claim (something that can only be guaranteed, under the Governmental 
Immunity Act, by a ruling that the notice-of-claim law is fixed as of the date the claim 
arises) is, indeed, a "substantive" right. 
The Goebels do not ask, even in this situation where the City has admitted (R. 
536-37; 578) that it had notice of, and denied, the Goebels' claims, that the Court relax 
its "strict compliance" rule. They do, however, urge this Court to recognize that its 
hands are not in this particular tied by any Utah statute or by any of its previous 
decisions. They urge the Court to recognize the uncertainty of what the Legislature 
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might do and, in light of Schultz and/or the considerations of subject matter 
jurisdiction discussed above, to rule that the law in effect at the time of the incident, at 
the time the claims arose, is the one that should govern; that the Goebels served their 
notice on the appropriate City representatives; and that the District Court committed 
reversible error in granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
"A smooth, safe crossing surface is important for pedestrians, bicyclists and 
vehicular traffic." Ex. P-48 (an excerpt from the "Omni Product Guide"; emphasis 
added). Mr. Goebel is living proof of that statement. 
A grave injustice was done when the District Court granted Southern's motion 
for directed verdict. This Court should, as expeditiously as possible, and so that 
Mr. Goebel will be able to participate in a new trial and see justice in this case, reverse 
that error and order that a new trial be held. 
This Court should also order that, in the new trial, the Goebels shall be allowed 
to pursue non-public nuisance claims (as well as public nuisance claims) based on 
Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11; the Goebels shall be allowed to pursue their §324A claim 
based on the Administration and Coordination Agreement; they shall be allowed, if the 
Court determines that that Agreement is ambiguous, to present their extrinsic evidence 
regarding its meaning; and that they shall be allowed (unless it is now an established 
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fact that Mr. Goebel's bike wheel entered the gap) to present the empirical testing 
evidence. 
This Court should also rule that the subject 1998 changes to the Governmental 
Immunity Act are to be applied prospectively only and should reverse the summary 
judgment granted to the City. 
Respectfully submitted this / i> day of June, 2003. 
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STATUTES AND ORDINANCE WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
RE: ISSUE NO. 1. 
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-26(2) provides, in pertinent part: 
Nothing contained in this section ... shall be construed 
to exempt any railway company from keeping every 
portion of every street and alley used by it and upon 
or across which tracks shall be constructed at or near 
the grade of such streets in good and safe condition 
for public travel .... The portions of the streets ... to 
be so kept and maintained by all such railway 
companies shall include all the space between their 
different rails and tracks and also a space outside of 
the outer rail of each outside track of at least two 
feet in width. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. §10-7-29 provides, in pertinent part: 
All railway companies shall be required to pave or 
repave at their own cost all the space between their 
different rails and tracks and also a space two feet 
wide outside of the outer rails of the outside track 
in any city or town, including all ... crossings ... used 
by such companies.... The tracks of all railway 
companies when located upon the streets or avenues of 
a city or town shall be kept in repair and safe in all 
respects for the use of the traveling public, and such 
companies shall be liable for all damages resulting by 
reason of neglect to keep such tracks in repair or for 
obstructing the streets. For injuries to persons or 
property arising from the failure of any such company 
to keep its tracks in proper repair and free from 
obstruction such company shall be liable.... The word 
"railway companies" as used in this section shall be 
taken to mean and include any persons, companies, 
corporations or associations owning or operating any 
street or other railway in any city or town. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Salt Lake City Ordinance §14.44.030 provides, in pertinent" 
part: 
A. Every railway company operating within the 
boundaries of the city shall keep every portion of 
every city street or alley upon or across which their 
tracks shall be or are constructed and maintained in 
good and safe condition to accommodate public travel. 
(Emphasis added.) 
RE: ISSUE NO. 2. 
Utah Code Ann. §56-1-11 provides: 
Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused 
by its neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient 
crossings at points where any line of travel crosses its 
road. 
RE: ISSUE NO. 3. 
The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 that was in effect 
at the time the Goebels' claim arose provided, in pertinent 
part: 
(2) any person having a claim for injury against a 
governmental entity ... shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action.... 
The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 that was in effect 
at the time the Goebels' claims arose provided, in pertinent 
part: 
A claim against a political subdivision ... is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
potential subdivision within one year after the claim 
arises... 
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The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11 that went into 
effect after the Goebels' claims arose, and that is presently in 
effect, provides, in pertinent part: 
(3) (b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim 
is against an incorporated city or town... 
. The version of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 that went into 
effect after the Goebels' claims arose, and that is presently in 
effect, provides, in pertinent part: 
A claim against a political subdivision ... is barred unless 
notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision according to the requirements of 
Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim arises.... 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on June 14, 2002) 
3 THE COURT: The record should reflect that this is case 
4 No. 980912368. Starting with the plaintiff's Counsel, let's 
5 have you identify yourselves for the record once again. 
6 MR. COLLINS: Peter Collins representing the plaintiffs 
7 George and Kathy Goebel, your Honor. 
8 MR. SAVAGE: Scott Savage and Casey McGarvey 
9 representing the defendant Salt Lake City Southern. 
10 MR. HANSEN: Kent Hansen representing the City, also 
11 present Clair Williams. 
12 MS. STONEBROOK: Martha Stonebrook representing Salt 
13 Lake City Corporation. 
14 MR. TRENTADUE: Jesse Trentadue and Kathy Woods 
15 representing Utah Transit Authority. 
16 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. Anyone else? That's 
17 it? All right. The record should reflect that this is the 
18 time the Court's set on the calendar to rule on the pending 
19 motions for summary judgment. I'd like to thank all of you 
20 for giving me the opportunity to review all the information 
21 that was submitted to me. I've had a chance to do that, and 
22 consequently I'm going to rule as follows. 
23 I'd like to first, however, address the issue of 
24 breach and proximate cause as it relates to Salt Lake Southern 
25 Union Pacific and UTA. I want to set Salt Lake City aside for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-3-
just a second, because there is an obvious relationship amongst 
the defendants at least as to that particular issue. Based 
upon everything I've read here I've come to the following 
conclusion. 
That taking as a whole the testimony of plaintiff s 
experts, the eyewitness — I think his name is Mr. Roberts — 
Mr. Goebel's testimony as well, and one of the experts I'm 
referencing, I think it's Mr. Smith and Mr. Collins and in 
particular Mr. Ingerbretsen. In this Court's view when you 
consider that evidence as a whole, I do find that the testimony 
establishes sufficient evidence which an inference may be 
reasonably drawn that the injury suffered was caused by a 
negligent act of the defendant, especially in the context of, 
in this Court's view, a lack of any non-speculative other cause 
of this accident. 
At the very least genuine issues of material fact have 
been established in this Court's view which precludes summary 
judgment. In coming to that conclusion for at least record 
purposes I have relied on the Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed 
decision which is cited by plaintiffs and found at 479 P.2d 28. 
I think that's a 1972 Utah Supreme Court case. 
As to Southern as well, for purposes of this summary 
judgment motion, this Court is also finding that these were the 
other issues raised in Southern's motion for summary judgment, 
that Southern does owe a duty to the plaintiff under various 
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statutory provisions including Utah Code Annotated 56-1-11, 
10-7-29, as well as the Salt Lake City ordinance which I 
believe is 14.44.030. 
Additionally, as to the duty issue at least, there are 
genuine issues of material fact. As to whether Southern is a 
possessor or occupier of land for the restatement purposes, and 
the cite of 3-28(e), restatement provision for duty purposes. 
Additionally based upon the evidence the Court is 
finding as well that there are genuine issues of material fact 
as to Southern's actual or constructive notice of the defect 
and opportunity to correct. So Southern's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
Going now to UTA, as I indicated a moment ago, the 
breach in proximate cause analysis I believe also applies to 
UTA. Additionally, in this Court's view, as to the duty 
questions raised by UTA, again under the restatement 3-28(e), 
I do think there's a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether UTA is a possessor or occupier of land. Of course, 
upon which and under a duty to keep reasonably — that property 
reasonably safe applies to a possessor and occupier of land. 
Additionally, and I think this is found under the cite 
of the restatement 2d 353, clearly genuine issues of material 
fact in this Court's view based upon the evidence regarding 
UTA's knowledge of the acts, negligent installation, knowledge 
of expansion of the gaps. That 353 restatement section really 
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is a — also involves an unreasonable risk analysis, and 
clearly in this Court's view the evidence is at a state where 
genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. 
I should also note specifically for whatever value it 
may have, I have yet to determine and have not determined as of 
yet, I do want to make clear, an issue which is being reserved, 
that I have not concluded, that under 10-7-29 of the Utah Code, 
or any Utah case law, that UTA is a railway company or railroad 
company. That is an issue that may require further briefing. 
For those reasons UTA's motion for summary judgment is denied. 
I should also note in particular as it relates to 
UTA's motions — I think this was raised by Counsel as well — 
this Court is finding as well that because of the nature of the 
defect, that the experts that plaintiffs have presented thus 
far are sufficient to survive summary judgment, and that UTA 
is not entitled to summary judgment because of plaintiff's 
failure — I think Mr. Trentadue made this statement in oral 
argument — failure to produce a railroad expert to talk about 
the standard of care. Based upon the nature of the defect in 
this particular case and the — and plaintiff's experts, the 
Court is denying summary judgment on that claim. 
Going now to Union Pacific, and again the breach 
proximate cause analysis applies equally to Union Pacific, 
there are a couple of different twists, however, but I still 
come to the conclusion that's appropriate to deny Union 
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1 Pacific's motion for summary judgment for the following 
2 reasons. 
3 At least for the purpose of this motion, Union Pacific 
4 has admitted to negligent installation resulting in gaps at 
5 this crossing. Then we have the testimony of Mr. Ingerbretsen 
6 regarding the significance of gaps at the time of installation. 
7 So in this Court's view we at least have genuine issues of 
8 material fact as to Union Pacific's, and if nothing else, 
9 genuine issues of material fact regarding Union Pacific's 
10 knowledge of gaps at the time of installation, the significance 
11 of gaps widening. 
12 I don't think the issue of whether or not you can 
13 make the disclosure of that problem is disputed, but clearly 
14 that is the theory advanced by the plaintiffs. I believe 
15 that's pursuant to the restatement 2d 353 as well, which 
16 involves an analysis of unreasonable risk and whether or not 
17 that defect was an unreasonable risk or not, which in this 
18 Court's view is, under the circumstances presented and evidence 
19 presented, clearly a genuine issue of material fact exists 
20 precluding summary judgment. So for those reasons the Court 
21 is going to deny Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. 
22 I'm going now to Salt Lake City's motion for summary 
23 judgment. Let me say that I am going to grant Salt Lake City's 
24 motion for summary judgment for the following reasons. I took 
25 a look at all the cases, and the 1998 revisions. I looked at 
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1 I all the cases that dealt with retroactivity, and the analysis 
2 of whether statutory provisions are procedural or substantive, 
3 and that being an important consideration as to whether or not 
4 a provision is retroactive or not. 
5 In this Court's view the 1998 revisions were not 
6 substantive; that they were procedural; that they only change 
7 the place where notice is to be delivered didn't affect any of 
8 the substantive rights of plaintiff at all. It was purely 
9 procedural. 
10 In this Court's view those provisions then have 
11 retroactive application, and in this particular case when the 
12 claim was filed — and forgive me for the exact date, but I 
13 believe it was in August. I believe it was in August of *98. 
14 Of course, the x98 revisions were effective at that time. It 
15 was the City recorder wherein — or the recorder's office where 
16 the notice of claim needed to be filed. It was not filed 
17 there. For that reason and because of the fact that the case 
18 law is clear that strict compliance is required, the Court is 
19 going to grant Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment. 
20 To the extent that it may have some appellate value 
21 as well, let me also add that at Salt Lake City's invitation I 
22 did take the opportunity to review and reconsider this Court's 
23 prior ruling in a motion to dismiss. After giving that — the 
24 I cases and the most recent cases for consideration, I have come 
25 to the conclusion as well that strict compliance is required. 
010 
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Dealing the notice in particular in the context of — the 
notice of claim in the context of Mrs. Goebel's loss of 
consortion claim, I have concluded that that — by just 
placing her name on the notice of claim was not sufficient — 
was not — sufficient notice was not strict compliance with the 
statutory provisions governing notice — filing of notice of 
claims and their content. So for that additional reason the 
Court would enter an order dismissing the loss of consortion 
claim. 
I think that's it from my perspective. Let's start 
with Mr. Collins, if you have any questions about the manner 
in which I've ruled now, now is the time to put them to me. 
MR. COLLINS: I have no questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then let me give defense Counsel an 
opportunity to defend. Go ahead. 
MR. SAVAGE; I have no questions, your Honor. I think 
on behalf of all of us, although we disagree with the ruling, 
we appreciate the time and effort the Court's obviously put 
into this. It's readily apparent to all of us that you've 
spent a lot of time on this thing. 
THE COURT: It's a lot to read. 
MR. SAVAGE: And we were very sensitive about over-
burdening the Court, and we appreciate the Court's effort. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. SAVAGE: With what remains we have a motion in 
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limine with respect to Mr. Collins' experts that hasn't been 
fully briefed, and I believe based on the Court's ruling that 
we may have an issue — in fact, I'm almost certain we'll have 
an issue as to whether or not to include Salt Lake City on the 
verdict form. 
THE COURT: I'm sure you will. I handed you one. 
MR. SAVAGE: Yeah. So we may want to be scheduling 
between now and trial some disposition of that matter, as well 
as the issue of the experts. 
MR. TRENTADUE: One thing, your Honor, with respect to 
the Court's ruling as to Salt Lake City since strict compliance 
is a jurisdictional issue we would probably move for a directed 
verdict as to the loss of consortion claim for the same basis. 
THE COURT: Well, you're going to have to brief that 
for me, Mr. Trentadue. I've not given that any consideration 
at all at this point, to be honest with you. I did consider 
what impact Salt Lake City not being on this case had, and 
whether they would be on the special verdict form or not, 
and I knew I was going to be confronting this issue, but that 
probably ought to be the subject of briefing. I mean, I have 
some gut reactions, but I'll keep them to myself at this point 
and wait until the issue is fully briefed. 
MR. TRENTADUE: So do I, for what it's worth, Judge. 
MR. COLLINS: I don't. 
THE COURT: I do want to make it clear that I have 
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1 definitely not ruled on that issue. Go ahead. 
2 MR. COLLINS: One question, your Honor, and I wasn't 
3 altogether clear from your rulings whether or not you intended 
4 that to apply to both the alleged negligent installation claims 
5 as well as the duty to warn. 
6 THE COURT: I did. I did. 
7 MR. COLLINS: Okay. 
8 THE COURT: Go ahead, Counsel. 
9 MS. STONEBROOK: I just wanted to say not all of us 
10 disagree with your ruling. I do join in thanking you for 
11 revisiting the issues and spending the time. 
12 THE COURT: I'll need for you to draft an order 
13 consistent with the matter in which I ruled on behalf of the 
14 City, and Mr. Collins, I'll ask that you draft an order as it 
15 relates to the other defendants on their motions for summary 
16 judgment. 
17 MR. SAVAGE: Just one point, your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. SAVAGE: According to my calendar, the next thing 
20 we're doing on this case is a pretrial conference on Tuesday, 
21 June 25th. 
22 THE COURT: Yeah, that's a correct statement. 
23 MR. SAVAGE: And just so that we're all on the same 
24 page, your Honor, I think you gave us a new date for the 
25 designation of exhibits, but I'm not quire sure that I have 
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that written down. Can anybody help me on that? 
MR. COLLINS: I think we just struck it pending the 
pretrial. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Unfortunately I would not have 
written that down either. 
MR. COLLINS: I think we just struck the date and — 
THE COURT: And I would encourage you to try to — if 
you can get that worked out right now amongst yourselves that 
will be great, as far as I'm concerned. 
MR. SAVAGE: I can't imagine that's a problem in 
rounding them all up. 
MR. COLLINS: And on that pretrial date, Judge, can you 
just give us a little guidance on what you expect to deal with 
that day. 
THE COURT: Just one moment. 
MR. COLLINS: I think you mentioned a questionnaire and 
some other things. 
THE COURT: Okay. Have you begun to talk about a 
questionnaire at all? 
MR. SAVAGE: I think we all thought it was a little 
premature (inaudible), also. It's something we'll begin to 
talk about. 
THE COURT: Well, let me ask now. I have not been 
privy to, and I'm not asking to be privy now. I'm obviously 
being very guarded here. I don't know where the state of any 
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settlement negotiations are. I know that you've had some 
process. I don't know — again, I don't know where you are. 
So I'm — well, let me just throw it out there. Have the 
opportunities to get this case resolved by way of settlement 
been exhausted? 
MR. COLLINS: Well, I guess hope springs eternal, 
Judge. We did have a mediator, but it didn't go very far. 
THE COURT: Well, let me — the reason why I ask that 
question because, I mean, if you're satisfied that it's futile 
then there's no sense in requiring you to bring — right now 
requiring you to bring on the 25th individuals with authority to 
settle this case, and the only thing we'll be talking about at 
the time of the conference itself will be trial management type 
issues so we can expeditiously try the case. That's what I did 
not know. 
MR. SAVAGE: My view is that it's futile, but the 
person I don't know that could change that is the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff's view as to their assessment of the case, 
but given their assessment of the case when there was a chance 
of us getting summary judgment, I don't think that the odds 
have suddenly improved. 
THE COURT: Mr. Collins. 
MR. COLLINS: I guess I have to say if it's fueled from 
Mr. Savage's side's perspective it's probably fueled from our 
side as well. 
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THE COURT: Then we'll just deal with case management 
issues, then, when we come on the 25th. You would help me a lot 
— and I don't know what your schedules are — I mean, I would 
love to have at least a proposed questionnaire by that time. 
MR. SAVAGE: I'll take a shot at it, Judge. 
THE COURT: Do you anticipate that — do you have time 
between now and the 25th, for example, to sit down and start 
talking about your ability to come to an agreement as to 
admission of documents so we don't have to spend unnecessary 
time dealing with those kinds of issues? 
MR. COLLINS: I think we can certainly make time, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: I notice that the defendants aren't saying 
— that Counsel for the defendants aren't saying anything at 
all. 
MR. SAVAGE: Well, it's just my experience has been 
that that's very difficult to do that far in advance of trial. 
We'll all get working, but that's usually something that's more 
productive a day or two before the trial starts than the 25th 
which is a couple of weeks before. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SAVAGE: I'm very confident we should be able to 
arrive at agreements on foundation, and the only issue would be 
relevance or prejudice. I can't imagine we're going to have 
problems with bringing people in just to lay foundation. So I 
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think that matter I'm quite optimistic about, but in terms of 
just having a list so that we can all agree is admissible, I 
don't think that's going to be doable by the 25th. 
THE COURT: When do you think the issues you've 
described will be fully briefed? Will they be briefed before 
the 25th? 
MR. SAVAGE: If Mr. Collins has a response memo, then 
we could do a reply probably in 4 8 hours on a motion that's 
been filed. As to the issue of what to do now with Salt Lake 
City on a verdict form, we could probably put together a memo 
in about a week on that. 
MR. COLLINS: I may — 
THE COURT: Do you think you could get all of that 
briefed before — on or before the 25th so at least — do you 
expect you're going to want oral argument on those as well? 
MR. COLLINS: I don't know yet. I haven't done the 
research or had anybody do the research to see. That just 
struck me in the course of your ruling today, but — 
THE COURT: I was identifying that as something that we 
could possibly accomplish on the 25th if — 
MR. COLLINS: Yeah, I understand, and maybe it can be 
done by then. I don't know. My gut impression is that Utah 
law in that area is kind of messed up. The 40 percent rule, 
and whether Salt Lake City is analogous to a parting with 
immunity, or are they analogous to a party that's settled, and 
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1 I just don't know if there's any case law on that, or if we're 
2 just going to be down here giving your our best guess. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. SAVAGE: But Judge — 
5 THE COURT: I'm sorry, go ahead. 
6 MR. McGARVEY: I was just — for what it's worth, we'll 
7 be filing a motion in limine with respect to Mr. Ingerbretsen 
8 and retro dovetail with what Salt Lake City has filed, and add 
9 some other issues as well, and that will be filed next week. 
10 THE COURT: Well, maybe on the 25th we'll — obviously 
11 we'll just be having the trial management conference and a 
12 status conference as to depending upon what is filed or entered 
13 by then. 
14 MR. TRENTADUE: I have a suggestion. 
15 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
16 MR. TRENTADUE: I'm sure I'll be filing some motions 
17 in limine as well, and I know that we're set to start trial on 
18 Tuesday, July 9th. We haven't yet talked about when it is that 
19 you would — knowing that there's only eight days set for trial 
20 when it is that you would like to pick the jury. Whether it be 
21 that morning or if you want us to submit the questionnaire the 
22 day before. The reason I mention that now is that perhaps we 
23 could set a time for hearing on our motions in limine between 
24 the time of pretrial or the time we start the trial. 
25 THE COURT: I can tell you now what I'm going to — of 
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1 course, I haven't seen the questionnaire, but what I'm thinking 
2 about right now is that I would get the jury panel in here the 
3 morning of the 8th to complete the questionnaire and then make 
4 the copies and to distribute it to you, and then we could come 
5 in on the 9th and begin selecting the jury, in essence, but I 
6 haven't seen the questionnaire yet. 
7 MR. COLLINS: Right. You don't know how long it will 
8 be or what we can agree to. 
9 THE COURT: Correct. 
10 MR. COLLINS: Do you have time to visit with us on any 
11 motions prior to the 9th, Judge? 
12 THE COURT: You know, if you ask me that question now 
13 I'm going to tell you no, and I'm not being disingenuous. I 
14 mean, I start a jury next week, but the bottom line is that I'm 
15 expecting we're going to try your case in July. I'm going to 
16 have to make the time when it's so requested, but it is very 
17 difficult for me to locate time right now, not knowing what's 
18 going to be filed and when everything is going to be fully 
19 briefed by. 
20 MR. SAVAGE: Let's see what happens on the 25th, then. 
21 That's probably the best suggestion. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
23 MR. SAVAGE: Not for me, Judge. Thank you. 
24 MR. COLLINS: No, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. We'll recess at this time. 
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COURT: The record should reflect that 
at this time. 
Counsel, this is the time that I indicated 
the jury 
to you 
that I would rule on Southern's motion for a directed verdict. 
And let me sa^ 
verdict, as he 
first that Mr. Savage's motion for a directed 
referenced yesterday, is based on all the issues 
raised and identified in Southern's motion for summary 
judgment 
After going over those moving papers again 
considering tt 
would at least 
raised in the 
and 
ie evidence introduced in this particular case, I 
like to go first to the duty question 
moving papers. 
that's 
As to Southern's motion for directed verdict on the 
duty question, 
to that ( 
I'm going to deny Southern's motion. I've come 
conclusion in essence for the following reasons. 
Let 
Mr. McGarvey, 
bringing them 
the statutory 
10-7-29, 56-1-
me say that I've concluded, Mr. Savage 
that Southern is a railroad or railway 
and 
company 
within that definition and bringing them within 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated 10-7--26, 
-11(m), as well as the Salt Lake City ordinance 
rm 
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14.44.030. And in this court's view, the key language bringing 
Southern within the definition of a railroad/railway is the 
"operating a railway" language. And in this court's view, that 
language is broad enough to encompass Southern's operation, use 
and utilization of the easement that they had supported by the 
evidence in this particular case to fall within those statutory 
definitions. So I would find that Southern has a duty under 
those provisions. 
I would also like to note as well that this court 
would also find a common law duty for Southern because of and 
based on the principle that the plaintiff's claim of negligence 
arises out of Southern's utilization of its easement, their 
allegation that the crossing was defective, or dangerous, I 
should say, and the evidence in this particular case as to how 
dangerous gaps are developed. 
I think it's undisputed that there are a whole list 
of factors, one of the factors being rail traffic, rail 
tonnage. And in this court's view, the plaintiff's claim for 
negligence arises out of Southern's use and utilization of 
their easement, giving rise to common law duties. 
There were two other points I want to make some 
reference to at least. And that is, consistent with Southern's 
memorandum in support and in reply, I am also finding that a 
duty does not arise under what Southern describes as a Good 
Samaritan Doctrine. That doctrine requires a number of 
024 
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1 requirements that are set forth in moving papers and I agree 
2 with Southern that those requirements have not been satisfied 
3 so the duty does not arise therefrom. 
4 Additionally, in this court's view I've found the 
5 agreements between Southern and UTA to be clear and unambiguous 
6 and this court is also finding that no duty arises from those 
7 contractual agreements as well. 
8 I am going to move on now to what I really think is 
9 the heart of this court's ruling, because there is a portion of 
10 Southern's motion for a directed verdict which I am going to 
11 grant which I think is fatal to the plaintiff's cause of 
12 action. And I want to read this language, and I think this 
13 language is out of the Fishbaugh case, which is spelled 
14 F-I-S-H-B-A-U-G-H. I apologize for not having the cite in 
15 front of me, but it's cited in all of the memoranda. This 
16 quote is out of that opinion and the quote is actually taken 
17 out of the Allen versus Federated Dairy Farms case, which is 
18 found at 538, Pacific Second, 175, and I probably won't 
19 pronounce this name correctly, but the Schnuphase versus Store 
20 Markets case, which is found at 918, Pacific Second, 476. And 
21 that name I couldn't pronounce is spelled, S-C-H-N-U-P-H-A-S-E 
22 versus Store Markets. 
23 This principle is espoused in those cases and, in the 
24 court's view, a long line of cases in the state of Utah holding 
25 for this principle. And I quote, "Fault cannot be imputed to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the defendant so that liability results therefrom unless two 
conditions are met: 
That he had knowledge of the condition, that is, 
either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge because the 
condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it, and, (b), that after such knowledge such time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have 
remedied it. 
And in this court's view, I don't believe that there 
is any competent evidence that would support a verdict in this 
particular case because the plaintiff has established in this 
court's view no competent evidence that a dangerous gap existed 
prior to the accident or that a dangerous gap existed for a 
period of time sufficient to allow Southern to discover it and 
a sufficient amount of time for Southern to remedy it. Without 
that evidence, based on the authorities I cited, in this 
court's view Southern is entitled to a grant of their motion 
for a directed verdict. 
In reaching this decision, consistent with the 
authorities, I am required to view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Mr. Goebel. And in viewing the evidence on the 
issue of notice and opportunity to cure in a light most 
favorable to Mr. Goebel, the best I believe the evidence 
establishes in that light is that dangerous gaps develop over 
time. 
026 
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1 In this court's view, that does not constitute 
2 competent evidence to allow the jury to make a reasonable 
3 inference as to how long it existed prior to the accident or 
4 when it existed prior to the accident. If you can't establish 
5 duration, you can't establish when it existed, it appears to me 
6 that only through speculation can the jury attempt to reach 
7 those conclusions in an effort to determine whether or not 
8 there was sufficient time to impart notice and sufficient time 
9 to remedy. 
10 In this particular case, the state of the evidence 
11 is -- considering in a light most favorable to Mr. Goebel, 
12 there is not one single report of a dangerous gap existing at 
13 this location prior to the accident. The inspector railroad 
14 employee-type witnesses that testified in this particular case, 
15 none of them testified as to the existence of a dangerous gap 
16 prior to the accident. No maintenance record establishes a 
17 dangerous gap in existence at this location prior to the 
18 accident. No public complaint was received by anyone regarding 
19 a dangerous gap in existence at this location prior to the 
20 accident. 
21 The plaintiff's witnesses who ride bikes who traverse 
22 the location in question saw no dangerous gaps at the location 
23 in question prior to the accident. Maybe the best witness 
24 possibly, Mr. Goebel, who testified that he traversed this 
25 location at least 100 times made no observation, report, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
098 
complaint of a dangerous gap at this location prior to the 
accident. 
One of the cases cited to me by Mr. Collins was the 
Maloney case, and there are other cases in the state as well 
that deal with this particular issue. But in Maloney, which I 
think is very distinguishable from this particular case, there 
was evidence that the defect in Maloney existed two months 
prior to the accident. 
There was another case cited to me I think by 
Mr. Savage, and it was the Kleinhart case, I think the spelling 
is K-L-E-I-N-H-A-R-T, it had to do with an elevator. The same 
issue arose. And in that particular case, for example, there 
were maintenance records which assisted in establishing the 
existence of the defect prior to the accident, there were 
complaints by employees in the building where this elevator was 
as to the defective condition of this elevator. That's the 
type of evidence which is, in this court's view, glaringly 
missing to provide a jury in this case a competent basis to 
draw an inference or come to a conclusion as to how long, if at 
all, the dangerous gap in this particular case existed prior to 
the accident. 
Now, let me also say that because the court has 
reached that conclusion, and I should note as well because 
there's been some discussion about this, in this court's view, 
as a matter of law, the protuberance is not a proximate cause 
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• 1 of the injuries complained of by the plaintiff in this 
2 particular case. It may very well be a factor in this 
3 accident, but no gap -- no dangerous gap, no accident. The 
4 dangerous gap is a proximate cause of the injuries which 
5 plaintiff complains. 
6 The fact that the evidence may be in conflict as to 
7 the duration of this protuberance, whether it is a protuberance 
8 or not, in this court's view because of the fact that it is the 
9 gap which is the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries is not 
10 inconsistent with the manner in which this court has ruled. 
11 I should also note that we have a public nuisance 
12 cause of action as well. And I'm also granting a directed 
13 verdict on the public nuisance cause of action. I've had a 
14 chance to review the Erickson versus Sorensen case which I 
15 think is authored by Judge Home. And the way I read that 
16 c^se, you don't have negligence, you don't have public 
17 nuisance. Now, there are some exceptions I think in that case, 
18 but those exceptions are intentional conduct, reckless conduct, 
19 ulnrahazardous activity. We have none of that in this 
20 particular case. Absent negligence, you don't have public 
21 nuisance. And consistent with the manner in which the court 
22 has ruled on the negligence claim in this court's view is also 
23 fatal to the public nuisance claim. 
24 Let me also say so the record is clear on this point 
25 as well, as to the notice and opportunity to repair issues that 
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1 are briefed and cited in Southern's memorandum in support of 
2 motion for a summary judgment and in reply by this reference 
3 because I have not identified each and every authority 
4 contained therein by this reference, the court is in fact 
5 relying on each and every piece of authority and analysis 
6 that's set forth in those portions of Southern's memoranda. 
7 Just so that the record is clear on this point as 
8 well, there are a number of other issues raised by Southern in 
9 their motion for a directed verdict, and the court is denying 
10 Southern's motion for a directed verdict on the remaining. 
11 I made this comment to Mr. Collins yesterday. The 
12 practical reality is that as a trial court judge you factor 
13 into an equation of judicial economies. But as I stated 
14 yesterday, I just think it's improper for me to allow the 
15 judicial economy argument to override a conclusion that a party 
16 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
17 Just a second. 
18 I think I've placed everything on the record I 
19 intended to do regarding the court's ruling, and I'm going to 
20 ask Mr. Savage just to draft findings, conclusions and an order 
21 consistent with the manner which the court has ruled today. 
22 Mr. Collins? 
23 MR. COLLINS: One thing I'd like to ask, Your Honor, 
24 just for my edification and for the benefit of my clients' 
25 understanding of this. 
10 
rnn 
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You may recall that at my request you came back into 
the courtroom last -- well, late yesterday afternoon after we 
adjourned and I think we had a discussion, brief discussion on 
the record. Mr. Savage was here. I'm just -- it's an argument 
that I didn't articulate when we were arguing the directed 
verdict itself, but I asked you to take a look at a --
THE COURT: An instruction? Yeah, I looked at all 
the instructions submitted and I think the authorities that I 
have announced are controlling. 
MR. COLLINS: If I could just make one statement, 
Your Honor. I doubt that it's going to make any difference at 
this point, but --
THE COURT: Let me ask you this: Are you going to 
attempt to bring something new to me that wasn't brought to me 
previously? If you're going to do that I'm going to foreclose 
you from doing that because I don't think anyone -- there comes 
a point where I have to draw a line and make a decision, and I 
have done that. And I don't think anyone in this courtroom can 
complain about whether or not they've had a full and fair 
opportunity to present their case and issue. So I have to draw 
a line at some point in time and I want to do it now, if your 
intention is to raise new issues that were never raised. 
MR. COLLINS: Well, it had to do with line of 
authority from other jurisdictions that said that in a railroad 
crossing case if there's a statute that says that a railroad 
1 1 
m i 
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1 has a duty to make it safe there's no requirement of actual or 
2 constructive notice. 
3 THE COURT: I'm aware of that authority and I think 
4 consistent with the manner I've ruled I don't think that is 
5 controlling authority in this case. 
6 Mr. Savage? 
7 MR. SAVAGE: Thank you, Your Honor. We will prepare 
8 the order. I'd like to know what the Court's preference is, if 
9 any, as to whether we await the discharge of the jury or --
10 THE COURT: The jury is going to get here at 
11 10:00 a.m. It was my intention to take them into the jury 
12 deliberation room and discharge them at that time after giving 
13 them an explanation of the court's ruling. 
14 MR. SAVAGE: That's fine. 
15 THE COURT: You should know as well, and I think 
16 Mr. Collins is aware of this, I do a standard practice whereby 
17 after a jury is discharged I enlighten them to spend time with 
18 me in effort to answer any questions they may have. It's also 
19 a learning experience for me so I can learn how I can make 
20 their experience more comfortable. And I intend to do that if 
21 in fact the jury wants to stick around to do that. 
22 You should know I usually also tell them that it's 
23 not unusual that they may be contacted by counsel for 
24 educational purposes and that it's up to them to decide 
25 individually whether or not they wish to have any discussions 
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after they've 
MR. 
from awaiting 
THE 
been dis 
SAVAGE: 
^charged. 
All right. So we may be excused then 
the jury --
COURT : You may. And there's one concern I had, 
maybe more paranoia than anything else since we've done so much 
in this case. We had stipulations regarding deposition 
testimony that was read into the record. We have to get to a 
point, if you 
segregate out 
've not done this already, where you need to 
from those depositions those portions that you 
read in open court. 
MR. 
THE 
SAVAGE: 
COURT: 
Uh-huh. 
Of course, consistent with the 
stipulation, we were not on the record when that was done. So 
we need to get that done. I don't think you've done that 
already. 
MR. 
tomorrow morn. 
THE 
SAVAGE: 
Ing. 
COURT: 
recess at this time. 
Oh, and one 
irrespective of how I 
case: It was 
including Mr. 
me in the pro. 
truly a 
and Mrs 
No, we haven't. We will have that by 
Okay. If there's nothing else, we will 
other thing, and I mean this genuinely, 
ve ruled throughout the course of this 
pleasure to have the three of you, 
Goebel, prosecute this case in front of 
fessional manner in which you have done so. 
This was not the easiest case in the world and it 
1 1 
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1 could have been made a lot more difficult if the lawyers chose 
2 to fight one another instead of trying the facts and the law. 
3 I just want to let you know that I really do appreciate it when 
4 lawyers practice in front of me in that manner. You might be 
5 surprised or you might not be surprised with the regularity 
6 upon which that does not occur. But I just wanted to say thank 
7 you for handling the case in a very professional manner. We'll 
8 recess at this time. 
9 I (Conducted at 9:31 A.M.) 
10 
n 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
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23 
24 
25 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
4 I, TEENA GREEN, RPR, CSR, do certify that I am a 
5 nationally certified reporter and a Certified Shorthand 
6 Reporter in and for the State of Utah, 
7 That at the time and place of the proceedings in the 
8 foregoing matter, I appeared as the official court reporter in 
9 the Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Tyrone E, 
10 Medley, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
11 proceedings had therein. That thereafter, my said shorthand 
12 notes of the Judge's Ruling were transcribed by computer into 
13 the foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and 
14 correct transcript of the same, 
15 WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
16 I this, the 18th day of July 2002 
17 
1 8
 <=*^ / ^ ^ . ^ ^ € ^ P 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Teena G r e e n , RPR^ CSR 
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ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION AGREEMENT 
Thi s ADMINISTRATION AND COORDINATION AGREEMENT ( the 
"Coordinat ion Agreement") i s made as of t h e 31s t day of March, 
1 9 9 3 , between S a l t Lake City Southern Rai l road Co. , I n c . , a Texas 
c o r p o r a t i o n ("SLS") and Utah Trans i t Author i ty , a pub l i c t r a n s i t 
d i s t r i c t organized urfder T i t l e 17A, Chapter 2 , Part 10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended ("UTA"). 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, pursuant to the Purchase and S a l e Agreement between 
Union P a c i f i c Railroad Company ("UPRR") and UTA, dated as of 
October 30 , 1992 (the "Purchase Agreement"), UPRR has conveyed t o 
UTA. a s of the da te of t h i s Coordination Agreement c e r t a i n r i g h t - o f -
way, t r a c k a c e and other assets and improvements l oca ted on UPRR's 
Provo S u b d i v i s i o n Line, and on UPRR's Lovendahl Spur a l s o known'as 
t h e Midvale Lead, (more fu l ly descr ibed and def ined below as t h e 
"Riaht-of-Way") excluding a f r e i g h t r a i l r o a d operat ing easement 
which was r e t a i n e d by UPRR; 
WKZRZAS, pursuant to a fre ight r a i l r o a d operat ing easement and 
an ass ignment agreement between UPRR and SLS, dated as of March 3 1 , 
19S3 ( the "Easement Agreement") , UPRR has conveyed t o SLS as of t h e 
d a t e of t h i s Coordination Agreement a f r e i g h t r a i l r o a d operat ing 
easement on t h e Right-of-Way (defined below as the MFreight 
Easement") in order to enable SLS t o provide common c a r r i e r r a i l 
f r e i g h t opera t ions on the Right-of-Way; U T A 0 0 1 9 
CO 
o 
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WHEREAS, t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o (DTA and SLS) w i l l be s h a r i n g 
u s a g e of t h e - Right-of-Way under te rms and c o n d i t i o n s s e t f o r t h 
b e l o w ; and 
WHEREAS, t h e p a r t i e s d e s i r e t o c l a r i f y and e s t a b l i s h t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o SLS's common 
c a r r i e r r a i l freighrfe o p e r a t i o n s on t h e Right-of-Way and UTA's ( 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l t r a c k a g e and p r o v i s i o n of p a s s e n g e r 
s e r v i c e on t h e Right-of-Way. 
. . < 
NOW, THEREFORE, in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e p r e m i s e s , 
r e s e r v a t i o n s , covenants and unde r t ak ings c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n , SLS and 
XJTA c o v e n a n t and agree as f o l l o w s : < 
SECTION 1 . DEFINITIONS 
The f o l l o w i n g terms and phrases s h a l l be de f ined a s f o l l o w s 
f o r t h e p u r p o s e s of t h i s Coordinat ion Agreement: 
f 
"Closing Date" shall have the meaning ascribed in the Purchase 
Agreement, which is the date the sale of assets from UPRR to DTA is 
closed and which closing is to take place, if practical bv December 
31, 199 2, but not later than June 1, 1993, 
"Coordination Agreement" shall mean this Administration and 
Coordination Agreement, 
044 
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"Easement Agreement" shall mean that certain freight railroad 
operating easement and the assignment agreement, concerning rights 
and obligations to provide Freight Rail Service,, by and between 
UPKR and SLS and dated as of March 31, 1993, 
"Freight Easement" shall mean the easement acquired by SLS for 
common carrier rail ftreight operations on the Right-of-Way pursuant 
to the terms of the Easement Agreement. 
"Freight Preference Period" shall have the meaning ascribed in 
Section 5*4 hereof* 
"Freight Rail Service" shall mean the common carrier rail 
freight operations to be conducted by SLS on the Right-of-Way* 
"Freight Trackage" shall mean .any Joint Trackage and/or 
Passenger Trackage, which is designated by UTA to be Freight 
Trackage pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof, or any additions to the 
existing trackage constructed by SLS on the Right-of-Way after the 
Closing Date pursuant^ to Section 4.1 hereof. 
"Joint Trackage" shall mean the trackage affixed to the Right-
of-Way as of the Closing Date that was included in the Freight 
Easement, (described in Exhibit "A" hereto) unless such trackage is 
redesignated pursuant to Section 2*3 hereof, or any Freight 
Trackage or Passenger Trackage designated by UTA to be Joint 
Trackage pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof. 
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1 
"Loss or Damage11 shall mean a l l cos ts , l i a b i l i t i e s , judgments, 
f i n e s , fees (including without l imitat ion reasonable at torneys 1 
fees and disbursements) and expenses (including without l imi ta t ion 
defense expenses) of any nature ar is ing from or in connection v i t h 
death of or injury to persons, including without l imi ta t ion 
employees of the par t ies ; or damage to or destruction of property, 
< 
inc luding the Joint Trackage, the Freight Trackage, the Passenger 
Trackage or any property on the Right-of-Way, in connection v i t h 
Fre ight Rail Service or Passenger Service on the Right-of-Way; or 
business losses resulting from or in connection vith an act or 
omission giving r i se to a claim for Loss or Damage. 
"Modification Agreement" shal l mean a written agreement 
between the part ies hereto entered into in anticipation of a 
Modification. 
I 
"Modification" or "Modifications" sha l l mean a l te ra t ions or 
add i t i ons to , or removal of, then-existing trackage on the Right-
of-Way, including but not limited to new connections, and changes i 
in r a i l road commuhication systems, signal or dispatching 
f a c i l i t i e s . 
i 
"Passenger Preference Period" shall have the meaning ascribed 
in Section 5.4 hereof. 
I 
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"Passenger Service" shall mean the transportation of 
passengers on all or any portion of the Right-of-way, which shall 
be provided by UTA or its designee . 
"Passenger Trackage" shall mean all segments of trackage 
constructed by UTA on the Right-af-Way after the Closing Date 
pursuant to Section t:i or 4-4 hereof, or any Freight Trackage or 
Joint Trackage hereafter designated by UTA to be Passenger Trackage 
pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof. 
"Purchase Agreement" shall mean that certain Purchase and Sale 
Agreement by and between UTA and UPRR, dated as of October 30, 
1992. 
"Right-of-Way" shall mean the following described portions of 
the property interests conveyed by UPRR to UTA pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of the Purchase Agreement: all right-of-way, 
trackage, and structures included in or adjacent to the property 
described in Parcels No. 1 and 2 of Exhibit "A" to the Purchase 
Agreement, including all real property shown and described in the 
Haps and other documents regarding the right-of-way which were 
included in Exhibit "A" to the Purchase Agreement, and all 
fixtures, tracks, rails, ties, switches, crossings, tunnels, 
bridges, trestles, culverts, buildings, structures, facilities, 
leads, spurs, turnouts, tails, sidings, team tracks, signals, 
crossing protection devices, railroad communications systems, poles 
and all other operating appurtenances that are situated: (1) on or 
„,o/«r «„w, 5 047 UTA0023 
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adjacent to the trackage formerly constituting part of UPSR's Provo 
Subdivision Line from the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary 
line (approximately UPRR milepost 775*19) to Ninth Street Junction 
(which is on the North side of 900 (NINTH) South Street in Salt 
Lake City at approximately UPRR milepost 798.74); and (2) on or 
adjacent to the trackage formerly constituting UPRR's Lovendahl 
Spur, also known aif~the Hidvale Lead, which departs from the 
trackage referenced above in a southwesterly direction .at 
approximately 6400 (SIXTY-FOOR HUNDRED) South Street in Hurray, 
Utah (approximately former UPRR milepost 790*52), crossing under 
both 1-15 and the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company 
("D&RGW") main line, and then heading south to approximately 7400 
South, to the point of intersection with the DSRGW right of way, a 
distance cf approximately 1*4 miles. 
"SLS" shall mean Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Co,, Inc., 
a Texas corporation and the Freight Railroad Successor under the 
Purchase Agreement. 
"UTA" shall mean Utah Transit Authority, a public transit 
district organized under Title 17A, Chapter 2, Part 10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, and its successors or assigns. 
SECTION 2. FREIGHT RAIL SERVICE; PASSENGER SERVICE 
2.1 Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Easement 
Agreement, SLS shall have the exclusive right and obligation to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
provide Freight Rail Service on the Freight Trackage and the Joint 
Trackage. SLS shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and 
shall net conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on 
the Passenger Trackage or any other activity whatsoever on the 
Right-of-way that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service. DTA 
shall have no right or obligation to conduct, and shall not 
conduct, directly or indirectly, Freight Rail Service on the Right-
of-Way. 
2.2 OTA shall have the exclusive right to conduct, by 
itself or through OTA's designee or otherwise, Passenger Service on 
the Right-of-way. SLS shall have no right or obligation to 
conduct, and shall not conduct, directly or indirectly, Passenger 
Service on the Right-of-Way; provided, however, that OTA and SLS 
may arrange, under a separate written agreement, for SLS to perform 
certain services on behalf of OTA with_ respect to the Passenger 
Service. 
2.3 OTA may from time to time, upon 3 0 days written notice to 
SLS, change any track designation (Freight Trackage, Passenger 
Trackage or Joint Trackage) to any other track designation; 
provided, however that no such change in track designation shall 
unreasonably interfere with SLS's Freight Rail Service on the 
Right-of-Way; provided, further, that the parties may agree to 
immediate track redesignations to respond to emergencies or the 
needs of the parties. OTA may not designate trackage as Freight 
Trackage without the written consent of SLS if such trackage is (1) 
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then being used for Passenger Service, cr (2) then not being used 
for Freight Rail Service- In order to ensure safe, economical and 
reliable Freight Rail Service and Passenger Service on the Right-
of-way, the paxties shall establish a Coordination Committee* The 
Coordination Committee will convene to resolve those administrative 
and coordination matters designated for Coordination Committee 
resolution by the terms of this Coordination Agreement as well as 
any other matters, upon agreement of the parties• The Coordination 
Committee shall be composed of two representatives from each party. 
The chief executive officer of each of SLS and UTA also shall be ex 
officio members of the Coordination Committee. 
SECTION 3 . MAINTENANCE: ALTERATIONS 
3.1 SLS shall be responsible for the maintenance, repair and 
renewal of the Freight Trackage and shall maintain, repair and 
renew the same to the standards it deems necessary for Freight Rail 
Service; provided that SLS shall, at a minimum, maintain, repair 
and renew the Freight Trackage so as to preserve the present 
condition of track, grade crossings and signal facilities, as 
described on Exhibit ,!Bn hereto- SLS shall bear all costs and 
expenses of maintenance, repair and renewal of the Freight 
Trackage. Nothing herein shall relieve SLS of the obligation to 
perform maintenance, repair and renewal on the Freight Trackage in 
a good and workman-like manner and in compliance with all 
applicable laws and regulations,
 T T m A A A O Z : 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3.2 UTA sha l l be responsible for t he maintenance, r e p a i r and 
renewal of the Passenger Trackage and s h a l l maintain, r epa i r and 
renew t h e same to the standards i t deems necessary for Passenger 
S e r v i c e ; UTA sha l l bear a l l cos t s and expenses of maintenance, 
r e p a i r and renewal of the Passenger Trackage. 
3 .3 Subject to Sections 3.4 and 10.2, SLS s h a l l be 
r e s p o n s i b l e for and shal l pay the cos t s of t h e maintenance, r e p a i r 
and renewal of the Joint Trackage and s h a l l maintain, r epa i r and 
renew t h e same t o the standards i t deems necessary for Freight Ra i l 
S e r v i c e ; provided tha t SLS s h a l l , a t a minimum, maintain, r e p a i r 
and renew the Joint Trackage so as t o preserve the p resen t • 
c o n d i t i o n of t rack , grade crossings and s igna l f a c i l i t i e s , as 
d e s c r i b e d on Exhibit "B" hereto. Nothing here in s h a l l r e l i e v e SLS 
of t h e o b l i g a t i o n to perform maintenance, r e p a i r and renewal on t h e 
J o i n t Trackage in a good and workman-like manner and in compliance 
wi th a l l appl icable lavs and r e g u l a t i o n s . 
3.4 Upon writ ten notice t o SLS a t any time, but a t l e a s t 
s i x t y (60) days prior to commencement of Passenger Service, UTA 
s h a l l undertake and assume a l l cos t s of maintenance, r epa i r and 
renewal of the Joint Trackage. Upon assumption of maintenance, 
r e p a i r and renewal of the Jo in t Trackage, UTA s h a l l maintain , 
r e p a i r and renew the Joint Trackage to t h e standards i t deems 
neces sa ry for Passenger Service; provided t h a t UTA s h a l l , a t a 
minimum, maintain, repair and renew the J o i n t Trackage so as t o 
p r e s e r v e t he t rack to FRA Class I t r ack and grade crossings and 
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signal facilities to their then current condition. SLS hereby 
acknowledges that the present condition of track and signal 
facilities is sufficient for its Freight Rail Service. If UTA 
fails to maintain, repair and renew the Joint Trackage in 
accordance with the standard set forth above, SLS shall have the 
right to maintain, repair and renew the Joint Trackage to the 
standard necessary to "fulfill its rail carrier obligations. 
SECTION 4. CONSTRUCTION ? MODIFICATIONS 
4^2 If SLS reasonably determines that Modifications are 
reouired to accommodate its Freight Rail Service over the Freight 
Trackage or the Joint Trackage, SLS shall bear all expenses in 
connection with such Modifications, including without limitation 
the annual expense (for so long as such Modifications are a part of 
the Freight Trackage or the Joint Trackage) of maintaining, 
repairing, inspecting, and renewing such Modifications, including 
any increased operating costs associated with Passenger Service. 
SLS shall not commence construction or other work in connection 
with such Modifications to the Joint Trackage or the Freight 
Trackage without entering into a Modification Agreement with UTA 
and obtaining UTA's written consent. The parties shall, through 
the Coordination Committee, negotiate in good faith to enter into 
a Modification Agreement for SLS's Modifications to the Joint 
Trackage or the Freight Trackage necessary for Freight Rail 
o Service, but such Modifications shall not interfere with or impede 
Passenger Service over the Right-of-way. All Modifications made by 
TTTA009.R 
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SLS to the Freight Trackage or the Joint Trackage within the Right-
of-way shall become the property of UTA. 
4.2 UTA plans to construct additional trackage (which, in the 
absence of some other designation, shall initially be deemed to be 
Passenger Trackage) on the Right-of-Way so that, through usage of 
existing and such additional trackage, the Right-of-way may 
accommodate Freight Rail Service and Passenger Service. UTA shall 
have the right to construct such additional trackage as it deems 
r*scessary; provided, however, that no such construction shall 
unreasonably interfere with SLSfs Freight Rail Service on the 
Right-of-Way but that SLS shall reasonably cooperate with UTA so as 
to allow for the construction of additional trackage on the Right-
of-Way, UTA and SLS, through the Coordination Committee, shall 
cooperate to secure (from a third party independent contractor) 
temporary substitute service during construction or modification 
periods; the cost of substitute service to freight customers during 
construction or modification periods shall not be borne by SLS. 
UTA shall be responsible for the construction of additional 
trackage for Passenger Service on the Right-of-Way and shall 
construct the same to the standards it deems necessary for 
Passenger Service; UTA shall bear^  all costs and exmenses of 
construction of such additional trackage. 
4.3 UTA shall have the right, upon 3 0 days written notice to 
SLS, to realign the Freight Trackage, the Passenger Trackage or the 
Joint Trackage on the Right-of-Way; provided, however, that no such 
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realignment shall unreasonably interfere vith SLS's Freight Rail 
Service but that SLS shall.reasonably cooperate with UTA so as to 
allow for such realignment. 
4-4 If DTA determines that Modifications to the Joint 
Trackage or the Passenger Trackage (after construction) are 
required to accommodate its Passenger Service over the Joint 
Trackage or the Passenger Trackage, DTA shall bear all expenses in 
connection with construction of additional, bettered, or altered 
facilities, including without limitation the annual expense (for so 
long as such additional, bettered, or altered facilities are a part 
of the Joint Trackage or the Passenger Trackage) of maintaining, 
repairing, inspecting, and renewing such additional or altered 
facilities. All additions, alterations and improvements made by 
UTA to the Joint Trackage or the Passenger Trackage shall become 
'the property of UTA. 
4.5 Excluding only (i) construction under Section 4.2 and 4.3 
.hereof, (ii) ordinary maintenance and repair work on the Joint 
Trackage (if UTA is ^maintaining the Joint Trackage pursuant to 
Section 3.4) and (iii) emergency work required for immediate safety 
reasons, UTA shall notify SLS in writing of any proposed work on 
the Joint Trackage and shall submit plans on any Modifications 
thereto. The parties, through the Coordination Committee, shall 
cooperate in good faith to ensure that such Modifications do not 
unreasonably interfere with or impede Freight Rail Service over the 
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SECTION 5- OPERATIONS 
5 . 1 DTA s h a l l have exc lus ive authori ty t o manage, d i r e c t and 
c o n t r o l a l l a c t i v i t i e s on the Passenger Trackage. DTA s h a l l have 
e x c l u s i v e authority to control operations of a l l trains 
locomotives , r a i l cars and ra i l equipment and the movement and 
speed of the same on the Passenger Trackage. SLS shal l not have 
any r i g h t to operate on the Passenger Trackage. 
5 .2 SLS shal l have exclusive authority to manage, direct and 
contro l a l l railroad and railroad-related operations on the Freight 
Trackage. SLS shal l have exclusive authority to control operations 
of a l l t r a i n s , locomotives, railcars and r a i l equipment and the 
movement and speed of the same on the Freight Trackage. DTA shal l 
not have any right to operate on trackage then designated as 
Fre ight Trackage. 
5.3 Except as se t forth in Sections 5 .4 -5 .7 , the trains , 
locomotives , r a i l cars and rai l equipment of e i ther party may be 
operated on the Joint Trackage without prejudice or part ia l i ty and 
in such a manner as wi l l result in the most economical and 
e f f i c i e n t movement of a l l traffic. 
5.4 In order to ensure safe, economical and re l iab le Freight 
Rai l Service and Passenger Service, the part ies hereby establ ish 
( i ) a Freight Preference Period for the Right-of-Way between the , 
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hours of 12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m., Monday through Friday, 
inclusive, and (ii) a Passenger Preference Period for the Right-of-
Way betveen the hours of 5:01 a.m. and 11:59 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, inclusive, and all Saturday and Sunday. SLS has inspected 
the Right-of-Way and reviewed the records of UFRR pertaining to 
Freight Rail Service on the Right-of-Way. Based on such 
investigation and review, SLS has determined that it can provide 
Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference Period.' 
SLS agrees to employ such equipment and employees necessary to 
provide Freight Rail Service within the above Freight Preference 
Period. The Coordination Committee shall, at either party1 s 
request, meet to negotiate in good faith regarding proposed changes 
to the Freight Preference Period and the Passenger Preference 
Period. 
5.5 During the Freight Preference Period, UTA shall not be 
authorized to operate trains or conduct Passenger Service on the 
Joint Trackage or the Passenger Trackage, without special 
permission from the dispatcher. During the Passenger Preference 
Period, SLS shall not be authorized to operate trains or conduct 
Freight Rail Service on the Joint Trackage or the Freight Trackage, 
without special permission from the dispatcher. 
5.6 During the Freight Preference Period, SLS shall manage, 
direct: and control, at SLS's sole expense, all activities on the 
Joint Trackage. During such period, SLS shall manage, direct and 
control all freight railroad and freight railroad-related 
TTTAOfm 
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operations on the Joint Trackage and shall direct dispatching and 
control the entry and exit of all trains, locomotives, rail cars 
and rail equipment and the movement and speed of the same on the 
Joint Trackage and the Freight Trackage. 
5.7 During the Passenger Preference Period, DTA shall manage, 
direct and control,-at UTA's sole expense, all activities on the ' 
Joint Trackage. During such period, DTA shall manage, direct and 
control all activities on the Joint Trackage and shall direct 
dispatching and control the entry and exit of all trains, 
locomotives, rail cars and rail equipment and the movement and 
speed of the same on the Joint Trackage and the Passenger Trackage. 
5.8 SLS shall pay all taxes, assessments, fees, charges, 
costs and expenses related solely to Freight Pail Service on the 
Right-of-way or ownership of the Freight Easement. UTA shall pay 
all taxes, assessments, fees, charges, costs and expenses related 
solely
 t o passenger Service on the Right-of-Way or ownership 
thereof. The parties shall negotiate in good faith to allocate 
assessments, fees, charges, costs and expenses related'to the Joint 
Trackage or shared use of the Right-of-Way; provided however, that 
nothing in this Section 5.8 shall be construed to require SLS to 
pay real estate or ad valorem taxes; provided further, that nothing 
in this section 5.8 shall be construed to require either party to 
pay real estate or ad valorem taxes assessed against the other 
party, 
UTA0033 
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SECTION 6. CLEANING OF OBSTRUCTIONS. DERAILMENTS AND WRECKS 
6.1 If by reason of any mechanical failure or for any other 
cause not resulting from an accident or derailment, any train 
locomotive, rail car or rail equipment of SLS becomes stalled or 
unable to proceed under its ovn power or unable to maintain prcoer 
speed on the Right-of-Way or if, in an emergency, crippled or 
otherwise defective cars are set out of a SLS train on the Richt-
of-Way, then UTA shall have the option to furnish motive Dower or 
such other assistance as may be necessary to haul, helm, or push 
such train, locomotive, car or equipment, or to prooerlv move the 
disabled equipment off the Right-of-Way, and SLS shall reimburse 
UTA for the reasonable and necessary cost of renderinc anv such 
assistance. 
6-2 In the event of any derailment or wreck of a SLS train, 
SLS shall clear the Right-of-Way of all obstructions within a 
reasonable time* SLS also shall perform any rerailing or wreckinc 
train service as may be required in connection with such derailment 
or wreck, in accordance with industry practices. In the event that 
SLS does not clear the Right-of-Way of obstructions within a 
reasonable time, UTA may clear the Right-of-Way of obstructions and 
SLS shall reimburse DTA for all reasonable and necessary costs 
incurred in performing such service. 
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SECTION 7. ALLOOTTng nr r . T . p ^ j - . 
7 . 1 Beth p a r t i e s
 s l l a l l a a d r t t t . ^ ^ ^ 
• B P U - H .
 f e d e r a l , « . t . M d l o o I 1 l a v s ^ r e g u i a t i o ^ ^ 
a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s , r e g u l a t i o n s or orders n r ^ m ^ 
r creeps promulgated by any court 
a g e n c y , munic ipal i ty , board or commission T , 
^ . . . „,.
 n
'
 I f a n y f a i l u r e of 
e i t h e r party to comply with such laws , r u l e s , regulat ions or orders 
« r e s p e c t to the use of t h e Hight-of-Way r e s u l t s in any f i n e 
p e n a l t y , c o s t or charge being a s s e s s e d a c a i n s t the „*„ ' ' 
-
 i n s r the
 other par ty , or 
«U" Loss or
 D M a g e , tte p a r t y w M c h f a . l e d ^ c o a D i y 
***«.. p W y M d i n d e a n i f y , p r o t e c t < d e f e n a ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
t h e o t h e r Party for such amount. 
7 .2 Notwithstanding ( i ) anythinc e l s e c o n f a b - • 
"
 e c o ntaxnea xn t h i s 
C o o r d i n a t i o n Agreement or ( i i ) o therwise a m i c a b l e 1 
*PP-ucal>le law regarding 
a l l o c a t i o n of l i a b i l i t y based on f a u l t or otherwise « , * 
^e^wxse, as between the 
P a ^ x e s hereto l i a b i l i t y for Loss or Damaae r e s u l t s , 
9 e
 resu l txng from or i*n 
c o n n e c t i o n with the maintenance, cons truc t ion 
. '
 c o n s r r u c
* i o n , operations or other 
a c t s or omissions of e i ther party s h a n h- u 
.
 P Y S 2 u u l b e b o
^ and paid by the 
p a r t x e s as fo l lows: 
(a) When such Loss or Damace r e s u l t s <v„ 
- . . -esuxts .rom
 o r a r i s e s i n 
connect ion with the maintenance, construct ion 
o n s
^ r u c t i o n , operat ions or 
o t n e r acts or omissions of only one of the
 Da>—•» 
une par txes , r e c a r d l e s s 
or any third party involvement, such r n « 
'
 Cn L o s s o r
 Damage s h a l l be 
borne by that party; and 
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(b) When such Loss or Damage results from cr arises in 
connection with the acts or omissions of both parties, or of 
third parties, or from unknown causes, Acts of God, or any 
other cause whatsoever, such liability shall be borne by the 
party or parties responsible under applicable lav. 
7.3 Each party agrees that it will pay for all Loss or Damage 
the risk of which it has herein assumed, the judgment of any court 
to the contrary and otherwise applicable law regarding liability 
notwithstanding, and will forever indemnify, protect, defend and 
hold harmless the other party, its successors and assigns, from 
such payment. 
7.4 In the event that both parties hereto shall be liable 
under this Coordination Agreement for any claim, demand, suit or 
cause of action, and the same shall be compromised and settled by 
voluntary payment of money or valuable consideration by one of the 
parties, release from liability will be taken in the name of both 
parties and all of each party's officers, agents, and employees. 
Neither party shall make any such compromise or settlement in 
excess of $25,000 without prior, written authority of the other 
party having liability, which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld, but any settlement made by one party in consideration of 
$25,000 or less shall be a settlement releasing all liabilitv of 
both parties and shall be binding upon both parties. 
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7.5 m case a lawsuit or lawsuits shall be commenced against 
either party hereto for or on account of any Loss or Damage for 
which the other party may be solely or jointly liable under this 
Coordination Agreement, the party thus sued shall give the other 
party timely written notice of the 'pendency of such suit, and 
thereupon the party so notified may assume or join in the defense 
thereof, and if the-party so notified is liable therefor under this 
Coordination Agreement, to the extent of such liability, such party 
shall defend, indemnify and save harmless the party so sued from 
all Loss or Damage in accordance with the liability allocation set 
forth in this coordination Agreement. Neither party shall be bound 
by any judgment against the other party unless it shall have been 
so notified and shall have had reasonable opportunity to assume or 
join in the defense of the action. When so notified, and said 
opportunity to assume or join in the defense of the action has been 
afforded, the party so notified shall to the extent of its 
liability under this Coordination Agreement be bound by such 
j udgment. 
7.6 Nothing in .this Section 7 shall be construed as a waiver 
by DTA of any immunity, pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, or applied so as to effectively 
constitute such waiver. 
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SECTION 8- T™*; TTOKTNATION 
8.1 This Coordination Agreement shal l terminate upon the 
termination of the Freight Easement-
8.2 Termination of this Coordination Agreement shall net 
r e l i e v e ei ther party, of their obligations or l i a b i l i t i e s to the 
other party arising prior to such termination. 
SECTION 9. COMPLIANCE WTTK LAWS 
UTA. and SLS s h a l l comply wi th t h e p r o v i s i o n s of a l l a p p l i c a b l e 
laws, regulations, and rules respecting the operation, condition, 
inspect ion, and safety of their respective t ra ins , locomotives, 
cars and other equipment operated over the Right-of-Way. Each 
par-ty sha l l indemnify, protect, defend and hold harmless the other, 
i t s a f f i l i a t e s , and any of i t s directors, officers, agents and 
employees from and against a l l fines, penal t ies , and l i a b i l i t i e s 
imposed upon the other party, i t s a f f i l i a tes or any of i t s 
d i r e c t o r s , officers, agents, or employees under such laws, rules 
and regulations by any public authority or coum having 
j u r i sd i c t i on , when attributable to i ts fai lure to comply with the 
provisions of this section. 
062 
UTA0038 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SECTION 10. CASUALTY LOSSES 
10.1 In the event that any portion of the Right-cf-Way that 
is being used by UTA for the continued provision of Passenger 
Service is damaged or destroyed by flood, fire, civil disturbance, 
earthquake, storm, ""sabotage or act of God, or accidents or 
. vandalism caused by third parties or for which the cause is 
unknown, then, UTA may either (i) repair, or cause to be repaired, 
that portion of the Right-of-way so damaged or destroyed to 
substantially the same condition as existed prior to such damage or 
destruction, or (ii) replace, or cause to be replaced, such portion 
with property of like kind, condition or quality. The cost and 
expense of such repair or replacement shall be borne by UTA. 
10.2 In the event that any portion of the Right-of-way that 
is being used by SLS for the continued provision of Freight Rail 
Service, and which is not also being used for Passenger Service, is 
damaged or destroyed by flood, fire, civil disturbance, earthquake, 
storm, sabotage or act of God, or accidents or vandalism caused by 
third parties or for which the cause is unknown, then, SLS may 
either (i) repair, or cause to be repaired, that portion of the 
Right-of-way so damaged or destroyed to substantially the same 
condition as existed prior to such damage or destruction, or (ii) 
replace, or cause to be replaced, such portion with property of 
like kind, condition or quality. The cost and expense of such 
repair or replacement shall be borne" by SLS; provided, however, 
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that SLS shall not be obligated under this Section 10.2 to repair 
or replace the damaged or destroyed portion of the Right-of-Way if 
in SLSf s good faith judgment the cost thereof would be excessive or 
unreasonable taking into account the profitability of SLS l s freight 
operations on the Right-of-Way, unless UTA shall agree to reimburse 
SLS for such cost. 
10.3 Except when subject to Section 7, in the event .any 
portion of the Right-of-Way is damaged or destroyed by accidents 
caused by either party or vandalism by the employees or agents of 
either party, and the party that caused the accident or whose 
employees or agents caused the vandalism shall bear the cost and 
expense thereof. 
SECTION 11. COMPENSATION 
11.1 Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
Coordination Agreement, SLS and UTA shall have no obligation to pay 
or otherwise compensate each other in connection with this 
Coordination Agreement. 
11.2 Any payments due and payable by SLS or UTA under this 
Coordination Agreement shall be paid within forty-five (45) days 
after receipt of an invoice therefor, by check delivered to the 
address of the payee as set forth in Section 13.4 hereof; provided, 
however, that in the event of a good faith dispute relating to any 
such payment, the disputed portion of the invoice shall be paid, 
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w i t h f u l l r e s e r v a t i o n of r i g h t s to p o s s i b l e reimbursement upon 
r e s o l u t i o n of such d i s p u t e . Any payments not made v i t h i n f o r t h - f i v e 
(45) days of an i n v o i c e t h e r e f o r s h a l l t h e r e a f t e r be s u b j e c t t o 
i n t e r e s t charges , which s h a l l accrue a t the h ighes t lawful r a t e for 
t h e forbearance of money. 
11 .3 Upon r e q u e s t , a party d i sput ing the accuracy of any 
i n v o i c e s h a l l be e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i v e from.the b i l l i n g party c o p i e s 
of such support ing documentation and/or records as are keot i n the 
ord inary course of the b i l l i n g p a r t y ' s business and which are 
r e a s o n a b l y necessary t o v e r i f y the accuracy of the i n v o i c e as 
rendered . 
SECTION 12 . INSURANCE 
SLS, a t i t s s o l e c o s t and expense, s h a l l procure or cause t o 
be procured and maintain or cause to be maintained during t h e 
cont inuance of t h i s Coordination Agreement, ra i l road operat ing and 
l i a b i l i t y insurance covering l i a b i l i t y assumed by SLS under t h i s 
Coordinat ion Agreement with a l i m i t of not l e s s than Twenty-Five 
M i l l i o n Dol lars ($25,000,000) combined s i n g l e l i m i t for personal 
i n j u r y and property damage per occurrence, with deduct ib le or s e l f 
in surance not g r e a t e r than F i f t y Thousand Dol lars ( $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) . 
SLS s h a l l furnish t o DTA c e r t i f i c a t e s of insurance evidencing the 
above coverage in t h e form of a po l i cy (or p o l i c i e s ) a t the t ime of 
e x e c u t i o n of t h i s Coordination Agreement. Such insurance s h a l l 
c o n t a i n a contrac tua l l i a b i l i t y endorsement which w i l l cover the 
arc TTTAnn/ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
obligations assumed under this Coordination Agreement and an 
endorsement naming CTA as "additional insured." In addition, such 
insurance shall contain notification provisions whereby the 
insurance company agrees to give thirty (30) days' written notice 
to the UTA of any change in or cancellation of the policy. All of 
these endorsements and notice provisions shall be stated on the 
certificate of insurance which is to be provided to UTA. 
SECTION 13. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
13.1 This Coordination Agreement and the agreements 
referenced herein constitute the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto with respect to the subject matter contained herein 
and there are no agreements, understandings, restrictions, 
warranties or representations between the parties other than those 
set forth or provided for herein. All Exhibits attached hereto are 
hereby incorporated by reference into, and made part of, this 
Coordination Agreement. 
13.2 This Coordination Agreement may not be amended except by 
an instrument in writing signed by the parties hereto. 
13.3 Waiver of any provision of this Coordination Agreement, 
in whole or in part, can be made only by an agreement in writing 
signed by the parties and such waiver in any one instance shall not 
constitute a waiver of any other provision in the same instance, 
TTTA0042 
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nor any waiver of the same provision in another instance, but each 
provision shall continue in full force and effect with respect to 
any other then existing or subsequent breach. 
13.4 A notice or demand to be given by one party to the other 
shall be given in writing by personal service, telegram, express 
mail, Federal Express", DEL or any other similar form of courier or 
delivery service, or mailing in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, certified, return receipt requested and addressed to such 
party as follows: 
(a) In the case of a notice or communication to the UTA 
Attention: General Hanager, P. 0. Box 30810, Salt Lake City, Utah 
S4130-0810, with a copy to William D. Oswald, Attorney for the 
Purchaser, 201 South Main Street, 12th Floor, Lake City, Utah, 
84111. 
(b) In the case of a notice or communication to SLS addressed 
to the principal office of SLS, Attention: General Manager, Carl 
Hollowell, P. 0. Box 57366, Murray, UT 84157, with a copy to the 
President of RailTex Services, Inc., 4040 Broadway, Suite 200, San 
Antonio, TX 78209 or addressed in such other way in respect to 
either party as that party may, from time to time, designate in 
writing dispatched as provided in this Section. All notices, 
demands, requests, and other communications under this Agreement 
shall be in writing and shall be deemed properly served and to have 
been duly given (i) on the date of delivery, if delivered 
personally on the party to whom notice is given, or if made by 
telecopy directed to the party to whoa notice is to be given at the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
te lecopy number l is ted below, or ( i i ) an r ece ip t , if mailed to the 
pax-ty to whom notice is to be given by regis tered or cer t i f ied 
mai l , re turn receipt requested, postage prepaid and proDerly 
addressed. 
13,5 If any provision of t h i s Coordination Agreement shal l be 
held cr be deemed to- be or sha l l , in f ac t , be i l l ega l , invalid, 
inopera t ive or unenforceable as applied in any par t icular case in 
any ju r i sd i c t i on or jurisdictions or in a l l jur i sd ic t ions of in a l l 
cases because i t conflicts with any other provision or provisions 
hereof or any constitution or s t a tu te or ru l e of lav or public 
po l i cy , or for amy other reason, such circumstances shall not have 
the effect of rendering the provision in question inoperative or 
unenforceable in any other case or circumstance or of rendering anv 
other provision or provisions herein contained i l l ega l , invalid, 
inopera t ive , or unenforceable to any extent whatever. The' 
i n v a l i d i t y of any one or more phrases, sentences, clauses or 
sec t ions of t h i s Coordination Agreement sha l l not affect the 
remaining portions of this Coordination Agreement or any part 
thereof . 
13.6 This Coordination Agreement: (i) contains headings only 
for convenience, which headings do not form par t of and shall not 
be used in construction; and (ii) i s nor intended to inure to the 
bene f i t of any person or entity not a par ty , 
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13.7 All of the terms and provisions of t h i s Coordination 
Agreement shal l be binding upon and inure to the benefit of, and be 
enforceable by, the parties hereto and the i r respective successors 
and permitted assigns. Except to a corporate parent, subsidiary or 
o ther a f f i l i a t e , SLS may not assign i t s r ights or obligations under 
t h i s Coordination Agreement. 
13.S This Coordination Agreement may _ be • executed in 
counterparts , each of which .shall be considered an original , but 
a l l of which together shall const i tute but one and the same 
instrument. 
13.9 This Coordination Agreement s h a l l be governed by and 
construed under the laws of the State of Utah, including conf l i c t 
of l a v s principles . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused t h i s 
Coordination Agreement to be executed as a sealed instrument as of 
the date f i r s t set forth above by the ir duly authorized 
representa t ives . • ' 
WITNESS: SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN 
RAILROAD CO.,-INC. 
Title: , . p _ 
UTA0045 
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UTAH TRANSIT ADTEORITY 
Bv: 
Title '.ydi^^/ -77U~<*^i_ 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
DESCRIPTION OF TRACKAGE SUBJECT TO SLS'S FREIGHT EASEMENT 
UP's freight railroad line located between Ninth Street 
Junction, on the north side of NINTH (900) SOOTH STREET, 
Salt Lake City, Utah (approximately milepost 798.74) and 
the Salt Lake County/Utah County boundary line 
(approximately milepost 775.19) consisting of 
approximately 23,55 miles, as shown on the UP's Chief 
Engineer's Alignment Haps of the Union Pacific Provo 
Subdivision Line and as shown on the Oregon Short line 
Railroad Station Maps - Lands a3ca Property Accounting 
Valuation Haps; 
UP's spur freight railroad line which departs in a 
southwesterly direction from the Provo Subdivision Line 
at approximately 6400 South in Hurray, Utah 
(approximately milepost 790.52) crossing under both the 
1-15 freeway and the DSRGW Railroad main line, and then 
heading south to approximately 7400 South, to the point 
of intersection with the DSRGW right of way 
(approximately milepost 1.402), a distance of about 1.4 
miles, as shown on the UP!s Chief Engineer's Alignment 
Haps of the Union Pacific Provo Subdivision Line and as 
shown on the Oregon Shortline Railroad Station Haps -
Lands aka Property Accounting Valuation Haps; 
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to 
UTA located in the center of historic Sandy (Old Town) which 
extends from approximately 8600 South to 9000 South along the 
UPRR Right-Of-Way and running from approximately 150 East to 
19 0 East; the east-west ' width "of this property is 
approximately 260 feet, more or less, with the exception of a 
small portion on the north end which is narrower, and its 
length from north to south is approximately 2560 feet; 
The trackage on that portion of the Property sold by Seller to 
UTA situated between 5410 and 5830 South Streets at 300 West 
and which is approximately 2500 feet long and 125 feet wide. 
BUT LESS AND EXCEPTING THEREFROM TEE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED 
PARCELS OF PROPERTY WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN OR SUBJECT TO 
THE FREIGHT RAILROAD OPERATING EASEMENT: 
SEE THE DESCRIPTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES 
UTA0047 
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(Exhibit "A" coacinued) 
A piece of land one hundred (100) fest wide, situate in the Southwest 
quarter of the Northeast quarter, and the Northwest quarter of the Southeast 
"quarter of Section Thirteen (13), Township Two (2) South, Range.One (1) 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, and more fully described as follows, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point on the East and West center line of said Section 
Thirteen (13), seyen hundred forty-nine and one tenth (749.1) feet East from 
the center of said section, said point being fifty (50) fest East along said 
center line of said section from where i t is Intersected by the canter line 
of the main track of the Oreoon Short Line Railroad; thence North no degrees 
and thirty minutes (0*30') East, on a line parallel with said center line of 
main track and fifty (50) fest distant therefrom at right angles, six 
hundred fifteen and twelve-hundredths (615.12) feet, thence North eighty-one 
dearess and fifty minutes (ai'SO'JEast, one hundred one and fifteen 
hundredths (101.15) fest; thence South no degrees and thirty minutes 
(Q°3CI)West, eight hundred sixty-two and seventy-three hundredths (862-/J) 
fest ; thence North eighty-nine degress and thirty minutes (89*30') West one 
hundred (100) feet to a point fifty (50) feet Easterly from aforesaid center 
line of main track of the Oregon Short Line Railroad; thence North no 
depress and thirty minutes (0°30') East two hundred thirty-three and 
sixty-Mght hundredths (233.68) feet to the place of beginning. 
A strip of land 100 feet wide, in the Northeast 1/4 OT Section la, T.2S., 
R.1W., Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lying Easter and adjacent to the 
present right of way of the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company. Said strip 
being more particularly described as TOIIOWS: 
Beginning at a point 1854 feet, more or less West and 311 feet more or 
l e s s , SoGth of the Northeast corner of said Section 13. said g " £ b « n g ° n 
the East riaht of way line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad 50 feet from 
•the center Tine of Its main line, and at the Southwest corner of the 
American Smelting and Refining Company's property; thence South 0 30 W., 
parallel to said center line, 1691.8 feet; thence North 81° E. along the 
South side of John Berger's land, 101.4_fest; thence North 0»30E parallel 
to and 150 feet from said center line OT Oregon Snort Line mam line, IBS/, 
fest; thence South 83°30W. 100.8 feet to the place of beginning. 
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(Exhibit "A" continued) 
Tne following described land claim, to wit; Part of Lot three (3),and part 
of the Southeast quarter of the Northest quarter of Section Six (6), in 
Township Three (3) South, of Range One (1) East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
Beginning eight 5/10 (8 5/10) rods East from the Horthwest corner of said 
lot three; thence East nineteen 40/100 rods; thence South one hundred and 
sixty (150) rods; thence West nineteen 40/100 rods; thence West one hundred 
and sixty (150) rods to the place of beginning. 
Less and excepting the followi-ng parcels of. property, which are included vith: 
Che Retained Freight Operating Easeaent: "* 
1- That portion within the bonnes of the cristinc sincle 
line through track which is approximately 66 feet in width." 
2. That portion of the land lying between the sincle line 
"through track and 14 f est East and aborting the canter line of 
the Easuerly nest track of the existing siding track situated in 
Lets 40, A3, and 62, Sandy Station Plat. 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT CONDITION OF TRACK, GRADE CROSSINGS 
AND SIGNAL FACILITIES REGARDING THE PROPERTY AS OF CLOSING 
TRACK: 
The e n t i r e t y of the main track r a i l s on the Property are 133 pound 
r a i l s (133 pounds per yard) and are in good condition. 
&~ 
The main t rack on the Property between t h e S a l t Lake County/Utah 
County boundary l i n e and north of the north end of P a l l a s Yard, a t 
approx imate ly 5330 South, Murray, Utah i s FRA Class I I I because o f 
t h e c o n d i t i o n of the r a i l r o a d t i e s . 
The main track between approximately 5330 South, Murray, Utah, and 
N i n t h S t r e e t Junct ion , approximately 3 00 f e e t north of the n o r t h 
s i d e o f 900 South S t r e e t in S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah i s g e n e r a l l y FRA 
C l a s s I I I but w i th s e v e r a l areas t h a t are on ly FRA Class I I b e c a u s e 
of t h e c o n d i t i o n of r a i l r o a d t i e s and occas iona l i n s u f f i c i e n t 
c r o s s l e v e l l i n g , 
A l l s p u r t r a c k s , team tracks and yard t r a c k s on t h e Proper ty , 
i n c l u d i n g the t racks a t P a l l a s Yard, are FRA Class I . 
SIGNAL FACILITIES: 
A l l o f t h e s i g n a l f a c i l i t i e s regarding t h e Property are i n good 
working c o n d i t i o n . 
GRADE CROSSINGS: 
A l l o f t h e grade c r o s s i n g s regarding t h e Property are i n good 
c o n d i t i o n . 
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BEPORT'NUMBEH • : * ' 5 ^ f S 5 5 WBH&ffi. 
W-% 
- • ::,>.?;<ix•:?.££*>*<> $ K B S 
^MSt^M IF fe)l SUBR0 
i^fr—i ' i f^^-- " 
8a£g& ARC AV UN mo U;cfc>^ .-,:-/;• 
:&-COINCIDENT 6;VGFEIA? 
% ^ j | | ^ ^ ^ ^ y | ARC | AV J UN | (ROjJ^fe<v.:; 
FOI 
OFFICI 
, -USI 
ONE 
T BEGIN REPORT 
OPERATOR NAME 
HIRE DATE 
^TWf 
SUPERVISOR'S NAME 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
OPERATIONS MAINTENANCE 
TDATE OF ACCIDENT 
lfl|*llfil'7l* 
MILITARY TIME 
*l7|4j£.. 
UTAVEHICLE NUMBER 
., 1 1 J . . . . . . . 
BLOCK 
1 1 J -
ROUTE 
L__L__ 
DIVISION 
1 1. i 
031 Meadowbroo 
021 Meadowbrook 032 Timpanogos 
022 Timpanogos 033 Mt. Ogden 
023 Mt. Ogden 034 Central 
024 Central 035 Component? 
029 Flextrans 038 Facilities 
ADDRESS OF ACCIDENT (NUMBER & STREET) 17*0 5 ^UT^^J ft ft 
NAME OF SUPERVISOR AT SCENE a NONE - REASOT 
CITY 5/-CL 
HOW CONTACTED: a RADIO a PHONE a EMERGENCY BUTTON RADIO WAS: a WORKING a NOT WORKINC 
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS NUMBER OF COURTESY CARDS 
a COLLISION WITH: a PERSON(S) a VEHICLE a OTHER OBJECT 
a
 NON - COLLISION (PASSENGER FALL — DISTURBANCE — VANDALISM — etc.) 
1 PERSONS INDICATE WHO: UD - UTA DRIVER (If INJURED) DV - DRIVER OF OTHER VEHICLE/MOTORCYCLE W - WITNESS 
INVOLVED OR INJURED UP - UTA PASSENGER PY • PASSENGER OTHER VEHICLE P - PEDESTRIAN/BICYCLE 
1 WHO 
1. 
|2. 
la 
[4. 
j l 
! a 
NAME OR DESCRIPTION 
— J _ _ i 
U^CA^LJ VQ-4UL£UJI _ 
1 
ADDRESS, CITY, STATE, ZIP 
•> 
PHONE AGE SEX 
i 
NATURE OF INJURIES IF AN' 
/ 
UTA0051 
WERE INJURED TRANSPORTED ? D YES 
DID POLICE INVESTIGATE ? D YFS 
• NO WHERE BY WHOM 
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ACTION OF VEHICLES 
BUS #2 #3 
a a a 
(MARK ALL SQUARES THAT APPLY) 
BUS #2 #3 
O D D STOPPED 
a o a STOPPING " a a a 
D D a STARTING O D D 
D D Q CHANGING LANES D D D 
O D D MOVING TO CURB j 
0 D Q MOVING FROM CURB 
TURNING LEFT 
TURNING RIGHT 
GOING STRAIGHT 
CROSSING INTERSECTION 
BUS 
a APPROACHING STOP 
• AT STOP 
0 LEAVING STOP 
D EOL 
a EMERGENCY 
0 OTHER 
TRAFFIC CONTRC 
a NONE 4 
D TRAFFIC SIGNAL 
D POLICE OFFICER 
a STOP SIGN 
D YIELD 
a OTHER 
VISIBILITY 
a SUNNY 
a OVERCAST 
• DAWN 
D DUSK 
Q DARK 
a SNOWY 
a RAIN 
a FOG 
a OTHER 
ROAD CONDITIONS 
a WET 
D DRY 
a ICE / SNOW 
a DISREPAIR*-
WHERE DID YOU FIRST NOTICE THE OTHER VEHICLE 
IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENT 
a AHEAD 
a LEFT SIDE 
D RIGHT SIDE 
D REAR 
D ON CROSS STREET 
O POINT OF IMPACT 
0 IN DRIVEWAY 
0 IN INTERSECTION ( 
CI OTHER 
MARK DAMAGED AREAS OF VEHICLES 
VEHICLE #2 VEHICLE #3 
rQi—r®T RIGHT r^i—r®^ 
VEHICLE #1 
m 
(TEH LED 
QCZDO1' 
TO GCT 
/= ^ _ ^ _ 
£ ^ O Z ^ ) 3 , LEFT <LQJ_L<O>-^ 
DESCRIBE DAMAGE 
Dp 
OD ra a en en 
TT XT 
.DESCRIBE DAMAGE. 
DRAW A DIAGRAM OF ACCIDENT WITH ALL VEHICLES INVOLVED: 
TRAVEL 
SPEED 
VEHICLE 
BUS 2 3 
LABEL STREETS 
AND VEHICLES 
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«\ 22-141 50 SHEETS 
IAMPAD) 22-142 100 SHEETS 
22-144 200 SHEETS 
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